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ARTICLE

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FRAUD
ON THE MARKET

†

WILLIAM W. BRATTON & MICHAEL L. WACHTER

††

The fraud-on-the-market class action no longer enjoys much academic support. The justifications traditionally advanced by its defenders—compensation
for out-of-pocket loss and deterrence of fraud—are thought to have failed due to
the action’s real world dependence on enterprise liability and issuer-funded settlements. The compensation justification collapses when considered from the
point of view of different types of shareholders. Well-diversified shareholders’
receipts and payments of damages balance over time and amount to a wash before payment of litigation costs. The shareholders arguably in need of compensation—fundamental value investors who rely on published reports—are undercompensated due to pro rata distribution of settlement proceeds to all class
members. The deterrence justification fails when enterprise liability is compared
to alternative modes of enforcement, such as actions against individual perpetrators, which deter fraud more effectively. If, as the consensus view now has it,
fraud on the market makes no policy sense, then its abolition would seem to be
the next logical step. Yet most observers continue to accept the action on the
same ground cited by the Supreme Court when it first implied a private right of
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action under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in 1964’s J.I. Case v.
Borak: a private enforcement supplement is needed in view of inadequate Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) resources. In other words, even a
private-enforcement supplement that makes no sense is better than no privateenforcement supplement at all.
This Article questions this backstop policy conclusion by highlighting the
sticking points retarding movement toward fraud on the market’s abolition and
mapping a plausible route to a superior enforcement outcome. We recommend
that private plaintiffs be required to meet an actual-reliance standard. We look
to the SEC, rather than to Congress or to the courts, to initiate the change because the SEC is the lawmaking institution most responsible for the unsatisfactory status quo and best equipped to propose corrective action. Because an actual reliance requirement would substantially diminish the flow of private
litigation, we also suggest a compensating increase in public-enforcement capability. More specifically, the SEC Division of Enforcement needs enough funding
to redirect its efforts away from the enterprise and toward culpable individuals.
The Article addresses three barriers standing between here and there. First,
there is a new justification for fraud on the market circulating in the wake of
the failure of the original justifications: fraud-on-the-market litigation enhances the operation of the corporate governance system. We show that this line
of reasoning, while well suited to justify the federal mandatory-disclosure system, does not support—and even detracts from—the case for fraud on the market. Second, we turn to politics to explain why fraud on the market retains political legitimacy despite the failure of its policy justifications. Third, we assess
the contention that inadequacy of public enforcement resources justifies maintaining a fraud-on-the-market action. To that end, we show that circumstances
have changed materially since the Supreme Court first invoked the justification
in 1964. The SEC budget has grown elevenfold in real terms in the intervening forty-seven years, with much of the growth coming in the wake of the Enron
fraud. The SEC’s enforcement resources, like those of the plaintiffs’ bar, ultimately are funded with dollars drawn from shareholder pockets, inviting direct
comparison between the two. We show that public enforcement offers the shareholders more value than private enforcement. Private resources are tied to a
low-deterrence, enterprise-liability framework. Public enforcement, even now,
yields the shareholders comparable damage returns per dollar invested in enforcement. It can be deployed more flexibly, and it can be refocused against individual wrongdoers to enhance deterrence.
We conclude that increased public enforcement makes sense for shareholders
even if it implies a diminished volume of private litigation and propose a political trade-off for the SEC to present to Congress: double the enforcement budget
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in exchange for an SEC-promulgated regulation replacing fraud on the market
with an actual-reliance requirement.
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INTRODUCTION
The fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) cause of action just doesn’t
1
work. At least that is the consensus view among academics respecting
the primary class action vehicle under the federal securities laws.
FOTM came forth making two promises: (1) it would compensate
present fraud victims, and (2) it would operate as a deterrent against
future fraud. FOTM is now generally seen to have altogether failed to

1

See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities
Law: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 209 (2009) (“[T]he conventional
legal academic view . . . is that securities litigation . . . is seriously compromised.”).
This view coalesced relatively recently. For many years, James D. Cox and Joel Seligman were the leading defenders of the action’s conceptual framework. See, e.g.,
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 511-15
(1997) (defending securities class action litigation by analogizing its economics to that
of insurance markets); Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on
Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Commission’s Authority”, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 457 (1994) (providing a broadbased defense of securities class actions). Professor Cox later reduced his level of support. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 449-52 (2005)
(questioning FOTM’s compensatory justification in the wake of empirical evidence
showing that financial institutions tend not to collect available settlement money).
Merritt B. Fox’s views have also changed over time. Compare Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1549-50 (2005) (criticizing judicial application of
the loss causation requirement from a compensatory perspective), with Merritt B. Fox,
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 252 (2009) [hereinafter
Fox, Civil Liability] (reconceiving FOTM as a corporate-governance device and FOTM
damages as a restitutionary measure lacking the objective of compensating shareholders for market losses).
Significantly, the only across-the-board defense of FOTM to appear in recent years
proceeds at an entirely theoretical level. See James C. Spindler, Vicarious Liability for
Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong About 10b-5?, 13 AM. J.L. & ECON. 359, 359-62
(2011) (showing that enterprise liability has deterrent value in a world where management and selling shareholders have a unitary interest in fooling buyers). We have
no quarrel with Professor Spindler’s signaling model within its four corners. This Article, however, addresses FOTM in its institutional context.
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deliver on the first promise. Real-world FOTM actions proceed on an
enterprise-liability theory with corporate—as opposed to individual—
defendants funding the compensation; investor “victims” are accordingly compensated from the pockets of other innocent investors. It
follows that not only does FOTM fail as a compensatory mechanism, it
doesn’t even make sense. As to the deterrent promise, FOTM is
thought to deliver, but only a little. Enterprise liability causes the
problem once again: if FOTM were serious about deterrence, the
funding would come from individual miscreants.
FOTM is an artifact of history. It follows from two ideas, both
bound up in the securities law concept of investor protection. The
first dates to the 1960s and 1970s. It holds both that investor protections under the securities laws’ antifraud provisions, in particular sec2
tion 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and
3
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 thereunder,
4
need a private enforcement mechanism and that the class action is
5
the procedural mode best suited for that purpose. The second idea
emerged as the courts elaborated the terms of the implied private
6
right of action by reference to the common law of fraud.
The common law fraudster compensates the victim by paying his
out-of-pocket losses. Thus, the securities fraud defendant should pay
the out-of-pocket losses of those who buy (or sell) a stock that is over(or under-) priced due to a misrepresentation (or omission). But the
common law template also threw up substantive hurdles. The tort of
fraud presupposes parties dealing face-to-face and requires a showing of
7
reliance on the misrepresentation, a showing that cannot be made as a
practical matter in a class action. FOTM, which the Supreme Court
2

15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
4
The private right of action under section 10(b) dates back to Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and was approved by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The Court’s decision was without substantive comment,
but included a citation to J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), which implied a
private right of action under section 14 of the 1934 Act, reasoning that the SEC
lacked the resources to review issuer proxy statements. Id. at 432.
5
See, e.g., Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with the Reliance Requirement in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 439-46
(1984) (explaining the interrelation between the FOTM presumption and class action enforcement).
6
See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977) (requiring deception); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring scienter).
7
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965).
3
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8

adopted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, patched over the problem by relaxing
the reliance requirement. With a famous citation to the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), the court ruled that a showing of re9
liance on the integrity of the market price would suffice.
It seemed like a good idea at the time. But FOTM simply did not
work in practice. The consensus to that effect is notable in itself because big-ticket causes of action tend to have squads of academic
10
cheerleaders. But that consensus fosters only a limited menu of policy alternatives. On the one hand, FOTM’s opponents argue that
FOTM and the entire mandatory-disclosure regime should be abolished together. On the other hand, FOTM’s proponents strenuously try to make it work. They take two routes in this pursuit. The first
route treats FOTM as a misunderstood cause of action in need of
fresh policy justification: if FOTM makes no sense as a compensatory
tort, then a conceptual framework that does make sense of it needs to
11
Corporate governance and agency-cost reduction
be substituted.
12
have been suggested as this conceptual curative. The second approach focuses on FOTM’s meager deterrent properties and then
looks away from theory to focus on practice. Under this view, FOTM is
13
a necessary enforcement supplement, despite its attendant conceptual
problems: even if it doesn’t work as promised, we are better off with it
than without it. Meanwhile, we can try to make it work a little better.

8

485 U.S. 224, 248-50 (1988).
Id. at 246 n.24. FOTM can be traced back to Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,
906-08 (9th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court’s explicit acceptance of FOTM was presaged by Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970), and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), both of which presumed reliance in
order to avert factual difficulties in other private actions brought under the securities
laws. See also Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (discussing with approval the lack of a reliance requirement in Mills and Affiliated Ute Citizens).
10
See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products
Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 668-69 & n.3 (listing academic defenses
of the existing products liability regime).
11
See infra Section III.A.
12
See infra Section III.B.
13
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 639, 642-43 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Capping Damages] (recommending a shift from assessing out-of-pocket loss to levying individual fines, but not
advocating for the termination of FOTM); Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate
Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the
Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 655-57 (2007)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Corporate Executives] (noting FOTM’s underdeterrence shortcoming and discussing potential reforms, but not recommending its immediate termination).
9
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This Article takes a new look at FOTM and its conceptual and
practical failures with a view toward expanding the list of policy alternatives. We reject the all-or-nothing connection that the opponents
14
make between FOTM and the mandatory-disclosure system. In our
view, disclosure mandates are necessary, but how best to enforce them
is a separate question. We also reject FOTM proponents’ conceptual
15
strategy for the action’s rehabilitation. As will be discussed below,
the switch from compensation to corporate governance does solve a
few problems, but in the end, it fails to break FOTM free from its original conceptual framework and attendant shortcomings. The practical defense is more compelling, even though it provides no theoretical
cure and offers only the negative justification that although FOTM
doesn’t work, it’s the best enforcement mechanism possible. This defense challenges FOTM opponents to make an affirmative case for
disrupting the status quo.
The issue is more political and practical than theoretical. Accordingly, this Article addresses the political economy of FOTM, explaining why a cause of action that doesn’t work continues to enjoy political
legitimacy. After surveying the political landscape, this Article maps
out a plausible route to a better policy outcome.
The prevailing policy analysis of securities fraud tells us two
16
things: First, fraud is undeterred. Second, an enforcement system
directed against individual perpetrators will deter fraud more effec17
tively than a system based on enterprise liability. These conclusions
hold out two routes to a better result. The first route would redirect
class actions for corporate fraud away from the enterprise to individu18
al defendants. This alternative has been explored in the literature.
19
But, in our view, this path is more expedient than promising. The
second route concludes that private class action enforcement is intractable and looks for alternatives. This Article pursues the second path.
Accordingly, we recommend a shift in emphasis from private to
20
public enforcement. FOTM should be abolished in cases where the

14

See infra Section III.D.
See infra notes 192- 04, 213-15 & 214-30 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 140-47.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 148-55.
20
Recent work by Professor Rose also stresses the importance of shifting emphasis
to public enforcement. See generally Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Law Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010) [hereinafter
15
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issuer makes no trades. An actual-reliance requirement tailored to the
circumstances of investors who do fundamental analysis should be
substituted. As this requirement would reduce the flow of privateenforcement litigation, public enforcers should pick up the slack. We
accordingly recommend that FOTM reform be accompanied by an increase in monetary support for the SEC Division of Enforcement sufficient to shift the division’s focus from enterprise-liability settlement
to holding individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing. We
look to the SEC, rather than Congress or the courts, to initiate the
reform because it is the institution most responsible for the current unsatisfactory state of affairs and also the institution best equipped to fix it.
Part I describes FOTM and its failure to accomplish its victimcompensation objective. The presentation concentrates on the numbers, showing how plaintiffs’ lawyers calculate out-of-pocket damages
21
that support multibillion dollar claims, which, if pursued to judgment against actual fraudsters, would result in hit-the-jackpot compensation and crushing deterrence. Unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately—attorneys in real-world class actions look for settlement
value, and those facing financial destruction are either disinclined to
settle or already judgment-proof. Thus, corporate issuers of securities,
hauled into court along with their employees on an enterprise liability
theory, pick up the settlement tab in FOTM cases. With the corporation paying the settlement, the cost of compensating the shareholders
in the plaintiff class falls on those holding the company’s shares at the
time of settlement. The shareholders in the class and the successful
plaintiffs’ attorney thus pick the pockets of the payor shareholders,
which include the company’s longer-term shareholders. Moreover, to
the extent that the paying and receiving shareholders are fully diversified, cash inflows and outflows from FOTM settlements even out over
time. This result makes FOTM a wash rather than a source of compensation, but a wash that ripens into a net loss once we account for attorneys’ fees, liability insurance premiums, and other costs.
Compensation may benefit one set of shareholders: underdiversified information traders who research companies and invest based on
reported information. These investors’ gains and losses do not necesRose, The Multienforcer Approach] (questioning the deterrent effect of relying on a trio
of federal, state, and private enforcers); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation
Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354-55 (2008) (suggesting that federal authorities be accorded the power to select private defendants).
21
See infra subsection I.A.2.
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sarily equalize over time, and compensation could reduce injury. Unfortunately, FOTM does not work here either because returns on litigation do not come close to covering the losses from fraud. While class
action complaints do claim losses in the hundreds of millions of dol22
lars, settlement amounts are considerably smaller. From 1996 to 2010,
23
median settlements returned only 2.8% of estimated plaintiff losses.
The misdirected compensation could be redirected to those who
need it by removing the Basic presumption and imposing an actualreliance requirement that is tailored to the circumstances of investors
who research companies. But because the number of plaintiffs able to
show actual reliance will likely be small, their aggregated damages
might be too low to support class action enforcement. Thus, FOTM’s
already modest deterrent effect would diminish further.
Part II examines FOTM’s impact on fraud deterrence and the justification for the action based thereon. We assume that fraud is a persistent problem and the current antifraud enforcement system, in the
absence of FOTM, is an inadequate deterrent. Although FOTM gives
the system a boost, its deterrent effect is significantly muted because
the corporation and its insurance company make the payments rather
than the corporation’s culpable agents. FOTM proponents dismiss
this objection as unpersuasive, arguing that an individual-liability system with penalties of sufficient magnitude to attract private enforcers
would be draconian and would likely impair recruitment of talented
24
managers. In contrast, a system of individual liability lacking that draconian aspect would remove the deep pocket from the settlement table
25
and reduce the incidence of private enforcement. As a consequence,
fraud, already underdeterred, would be deterred even less, and its
deadweight social cost would increase. Finally, public enforcement is
not an effective substitute due to incentive problems and political con26
straints.

22

See infra subsection I.A.2 for the calculation process. For a report on the recent
filings, see CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2011 MID-YEAR
ASSESSMENT 11 (2011), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_
research/2011_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2011_Mid_Year_Assessment.pdf.
23
ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 10 fig.10 (2011), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/securities_settlements_2010 (follow “Securities Class
Action Settlements–2010 Review and Analysis” hyperlink).
24
See infra text accompanying note 139.
25
See infra text accompanying note 139.
26
See infra text accompanying notes 150-58.
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We evaluate these assertions, concluding that any deterrent valueadded is indeed modest. The economics of reputation does the heavy
lifting respecting corporate-actor incentives. To the extent that fraud
persists despite this economic constraint, FOTM has done almost
nothing to solve the problem; hence the steady and material increase
in public antifraud enforcement resources in recent years. We conclude that it is no longer necessary to view FOTM as an essential component in a viable antifraud enforcement system.
Part III analyzes governance and agency-cost reduction as substitute justifications for FOTM and shows that they fall short. At first,
the governance justification seems to provide a viable framework because it solves the pocket-shifting problem that undermines the compensation justification. Once governance replaces tort as the framework justifying FOTM, shareholder funding is no longer objectionable
because shareholders happily pay for everything related to corporate
governance so long as the agency-cost reduction exceeds the expenditure. But do shareholders have cause to be happy in the case of
FOTM actions?
In the securities context, reducing agency costs means enhancing
corporate transparency. Federal securities laws require truthful disclosures in order to seek to make corporate strategies and financial
results observable from the outside. This leads to two claims about
agency costs. First, investors in an unscrupulous market will disregard
27
reported earnings, effectively raising the market’s cost of capital.
Second, transparency should lead to better business planning and execution because shareholder monitoring not only deters outright
28
fraud, but also improves business policy.
This raises the question of whether FOTM actions enhance transparency. FOTM litigation, taken alone, adds little to nothing to the
informational mix. The suits are ex post constructs activated not by
the incorrect disclosure itself, but by its correction. The heavy lifting
on transparency occurs ex ante, when the mandatory-disclosure system’s rulebook instructs the corporation to make information public

27

Cf. Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 253 (noting that disclosure is unlikely to
have an effect on investor protection where shares are unfair on average).
28
The end point is the same as with deterrence: more transparency means better
governance and a lower cost of capital, and therefore it creates more value for each
shareholder. Cf. id. at 252 (arguing that among the primary benefits of disclosure “are
a more efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a result of improved corporate governance, increased capital market liquidity, and the consequent reduction in
the cost of capital”).
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and to produce reliable financials. Any “governance” contribution,
then, is simply a derivative of the contribution already made by the
mandatory disclosure system. FOTM assists only by helping to keep
the ex ante information base free of misrepresentations. We accordingly return to the deterrence justification. But we have already seen
that FOTM comes up short as a means of deterrence.
There is an additional line of argument here: FOTM actions are
used as federal proxies for litigation that could be brought under state
corporate law’s duty of care, addressing management defalcations in
business operations and giving shareholders a direct mode of intervention that bypasses the board of directors. This also doesn’t work
because FOTM does not hold managers directly accountable for failure. Its consequences do not follow from the judgment of the shareholders acting as a group, as occurs when the franchise is exercised.
And those who make the decisions—lawyers, pension funds serving as
representative plaintiffs, and federal judges—are largely unaccountable from a governance perspective.
There is something to the point that FOTM overlaps with the territory covered by the state law duty of care, but we think the comparison has devastating implications for FOTM. The state law duty of
29
care incorporated an opt-out possibility a quarter century ago, and
by now most companies have opted out with their shareholders’ ap30
proval. In contrast, FOTM, like the rest of securities law, is mandatory. We do not question federal disclosure mandates, but we think a
shareholder opt-out provision makes sense for FOTM, at least in lieu
of outright abolition.
The Article, having suggested reform, turns to two barriers that
block the path to a better result. The first is political: private securities litigation continues to enjoy political protection in Washington
despite its failure in practice. The second barrier is fiscal: the SEC is
assumed to be chronically underfunded, which would foreclose a shift
to public enforcement.
Part IV takes up politics. FOTM endures as institutionally and
31
economically salient as ever, despite layers of constraints and limita29

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (stating that the certificate
of incorporation may contain a provision that eliminates or limits the personal liability
of a director to the corporation or stockholders for breach of fiduciary duty).
30
See infra note 212.
31
Total annual settlement amounts for federal securities cases peaked at $18.3
billion in 2006 as Enron-era litigation worked its way through the system. Annual settlement amounts in subsequent years were $7.6 billion in 2007, $2.8 billion in 2008,
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University of Pennsylvania Law Review
32

33

tions imposed by congressional and judicial action as well as erosion of support for its policy justification. Why? Political vulnerability
does not necessarily follow when a legal institution makes no policy
sense. Indeed, Congress considered eliminating FOTM before it
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),
34
but decided instead to advance a smaller-scale reform. The business
lobby has a follow-up package ready to be unwrapped in the right polit35
ical climate. If the past is any guide, an expanding economy and a
36
bull market will be necessary conditions for such legislation’s passage.
Accordingly, FOTM is safe for now.
In fact, it is better than safe. Part IV describes deeper political
forces that legitimize private class action enforcement. FOTM suits
are politically legitimate because managers are empowered actors in
society and private anti-fraud litigation is a means with which to challenge their business decisions. Meanwhile, remaining questions about
the incentives of those filing FOTM suits have diminished in volume:
37
the PSLRA diminished the strike-suit problem and brought in institu38
tional investors as lead shareholders, which made class actions more
respectable. Even proponents of “light touch” financial regulation

$3.8 billion in 2009, and $3.1 billion in 2010. RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 1
fig.1. New class action filings peaked in 1998 with 242 new filings, but 2008’s 223 new
cases came close. In 2010, new filings decreased to 176. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 3 fig.2 (2011), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-2010-year-in-review (follow “Securities
Class Action Filings–2010 Year in Review” hyperlink).
32
See infra notes 229-44 & 298 and accompanying text.
33
See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
153 (2008) (holding that customer/supplier companies cannot be brought within a
securities suit because the investors did not rely on misrepresentations from those
companies); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007)
(holding that the “strong inference” standard in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) meant that
the “inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must
be cogent”); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (requiring plaintiff
to show “some indication of the [economic] loss [suffered] and the causal connection
that the plaintiff has in mind”); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an
aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b)”).
34
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 10467, sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(3), (c), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4 (2006)) (imposing barriers to litigation, such as sanctions for abusive litigation
and discovery stays during pending motions to dismiss).
35
See infra notes 292-14 and accompanying text.
36
See infra notes 234-49 and accompanying text.
37
See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
38
See infra notes 278-284 and accompanying text.
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balk at pulling the plug on FOTM because the specter of financial
39
fraud looms large in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals.
In addition, shareholders have emerged as a politically salient interest group. Decades ago, no one thought of a shareholder as a
40
proxy for the median voter. But things are different in our ownership society. Even though it makes little policy sense to pursue the
shareholder interest in out-of-pocket loss compensation, invoking that
interest could garner legislative results in the right political climate.
That a different mode of enforcement might more effectively challenge management decisions, bring fraudsters to account, or protect
the shareholder interest, makes FOTM contestable without denuding
it of political legitimacy. The political barrier, then, is high.
Part V considers a core component of the FOTM defense: the argument that we have to live with this bad tort because public enforcement resources are inadequate. The SEC’s enforcement capacity
has changed substantially since the Supreme Court first implied a private right of action in 1964. Today’s SEC deploys enforcement resources of materially greater magnitude than it did at that time. The
SEC’s 1964 budget was $13.9 million compared to its 2010 budget of
$1.1 billion, which represents an inflation-adjusted increase factor of
41
11.2. A significant portion of the increases occurred in the recent
42
post-Enron environment. While damage dollars yielded by private
enforcement once dwarfed those brought in by SEC enforcers, that no
43
longer is the case. More to the point, there is reason to believe that
the SEC offers shareholders a more efficient use of enforcement resources. There is an irony here—just as the shareholders pay the
damages in FOTM actions, so do they fund the SEC through fees collected in connection with market trades and securities registrations.
Part V shows that damages ordered in SEC proceedings cost the shareholders less than do those stipulated in private sector settlements.
We do not claim that today’s SEC makes the private-enforcement
supplement irrelevant. Nor do we contest the point that FOTM’s re-

39

Cf. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S
US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 74-76 (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf (recognizing that many securities class action settlements are based on “legitimate” claims by investors with “warranted damages,” but recognizing the negative perception of being a litigious society).
40
See infra notes 245-72 and accompanying text.
41
See infra text accompanying note 311-31.
42
See infra Figure 1.
43
See infra text accompanying note 324.
AND THE
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moval could result in lax enforcement. We do suggest that expanding
and refocusing the SEC could more than make up for reduced private-sector enforcement at no additional cost to the shareholders. To
that end, we propose a trade off: the SEC should ask for more money
and refocus its enforcement operation on individual defendants and,
in return, propose a rule that eliminates the FOTM presumption in
private litigation.
I. FRAUD ON THE MARKET AS COMPENSATION
Fraud on the market under Rule 10b-5 takes the common law tort
of misrepresentation from face-to-face dealings to faceless markets,
remaking it into a vehicle for class action litigation against those who
make false and misleading statements about publicly traded securi44
ties. As at common law, the defendant must act with “scienter”—that
45
is, recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally —and the plaintiff class
members must be the purchasers or the sellers of the subject secu46
rity. But the defendant need not be a contract counterparty and, in47
deed, need not be trading at all. Nor do the plaintiffs need to have
relied on anything the defendant said. Under the Supreme Court’s
Basic decision, class members benefit from a rebuttable presumption
48
of reliance on the integrity of the market price, which is grounded in
the assumptions that the price of an actively traded stock reflects avail-

44

See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (holding that a press release was issued in a manner intended to affect stock
prices and influence investors and remanding the case to determine whether the release was misleading to investors).
45
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining scienter in terms of intentional conduct, but declining to decide whether recklessness falls
within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
46
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975) (noting
that violations under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 are “expressly limited to purchasers or sellers of securities”).
47
See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that
Rule 10b-5’s “‘in connection with’ element may be established by proof of the materiality of the misrepresentation and the means of its dissemination”).
48
485 U.S. 224, 246 - 47 (1988). The Court interpolated the presumption for the
express purpose of facilitating class action certification. Id. at 250. A predecessor case
involving an omitted fact in a face-to-face transaction, Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, held that reliance can be presumed from the materiality of the facts omitted. 406 U.S. 128 153-54(1972). Subsequent cases have read the rule to apply only in
cases of omission. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (relying on Affliated Ute Citizens to find that the presumption of reliance is not properly
applied unless the case “primarily alleges omissions”).
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able public information and that misinformation can impair the price’s
accuracy. Finally, in a limiting adjustment, Rule 10b-5 requires the
49
plaintiff to show that the misrepresentation caused the loss.
Under the Supreme Court’s Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
decision, a price drop incident to a later disclosure of the truth will
not be sufficient proof by itself of loss causation, for the reduced price
“may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately
50
or together account for some or all of that lower price.” If the plaintiff class pleads and proves all of the above, it recovers out-of-pocket
damages as at common law, which are calculated as the difference be51
tween the inflated price and the securities’ intrinsic value.
Several additional points about FOTM cases are worth noting.
First, insider trading is not a necessary part of the fact pattern, even
52
though it is sometimes alleged concurrently. Neither is corporate
profit-taking through sales of newly issued, overpriced stock a neces53
Accordingly, profit disgorgement is not central to
sary factor.
FOTM’s economic picture, even though it may show up in a given
case. FOTM instead concerns the informational damage that company insiders inflict on stock traders. Unsurprisingly, the insiders are
54
usually high-level managers at the stock issuer in question. But as
long as there is at least one human defendant who is an agent of the
corporation that issued the pertinent securities, the issuer will be added

49

The loss-causation requirement dates back to Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974). Congress later codified the requirement in the
PSLRA. PSLRA Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101(b), § 21D, 109 Stat. 737, 743 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006)).
50
544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
51
See, e.g., Harris v. Amer. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-27 (8th Cir. 1975) (discussing possible methods of calculating damages).
52
Insider trading allegations have decreased steadily in recent years. They appeared
in thirty-eight percent of securities class action complaints filed in 2006, but only in sixteen percent of complaints in 2010. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 31.
53
Corporations that make material misstatements in connection with new issues
can be sued under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 without a showing of corporate profit-taking. Securites Act of 1933 (1933 Act), ch. 38, 48 Stat. 82 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k).
54
In 2004, chief executive officers and chief financial officers were named in ninetysix percent and eighty-three percent of securities class action lawsuits, respectively.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1549 tbl.4 (2006) (citing PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2004 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 11 (2004)).
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55

as a defendant on an enterprise-liability theory.
This extension
catches a deep pocket that will have insured itself against the loss, increasing the amount of recovery available to plaintiffs.
The cause of action, thus described, pursues federal securities
laws’ purpose of protecting investors in two ways: first, it compensates
fraud victims for their losses, and, second, it deters fraud by imposing
compensatory payment. This Part considers FOTM’s performance of
the first role. Section A shows how damages are calculated. Section B
then shows both how damages are reduced in the course of settlement
negotiations and how they are funded. Section C evaluates the results,
illustrating that FOTM fails to realize its compensatory purpose in two
ways. It cannot meaningfully compensate shareholders because most
shareholders suffer no damages from fraud and only a subset of
shareholders bears the settlement costs. At the same time, a shareholder who has actually sustained an economic loss receives no relief
from small FOTM settlements. An actual reliance requirement would
address these problems but would also result in a diminished flow of
private litigation.
A. Calculating Out-of-Pocket Damages under FOTM
We begin our exploration of the meaning of “compensation” under FOTM with damage calculation.
1. The Price Drop
Settlement value stems from class damages, which begin with a
sharp price drop in the wake of a corrective disclosure. While it is not
true that a large drop in a company’s stock inevitably leads to FOTM
56
litigation, it is true that plaintiffs investigate stock-price drops as pre-

55

The defendant can incur liability under statutory or common law. Under “control person” liability, good faith is a defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (providing that the
controlling person is not liable if he had no “reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts” under which he would be liable); id. § 78t(a) (exempting controlling persons from liability if they acted in good faith). However, under agency law, employer liability follows as long as the employee is acting within the scope of employment.
See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets:
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (noting that the good faith defense
is “illusory” because courts apply agency law to securities fraud lawsuits).
56
See Jennifer Francis et al., Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosures, 32 J.
ACCT. RES. 137, 138 (1994) (noting that of fifty-one firms that reported a twentypercent or greater decline in earnings or sales, only one was subject to a shareholder
lawsuit related to the announcement of that decline).
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57

liminary indicators of FOTM actionability. FOTM plaintiffs follow
the money and look for big numbers, and they do so even more since
58
the PSLRA raised litigation costs. Unsurprisingly, FOTM defendants
59
tend to be big companies—larger even than their industry peers.
The plaintiffs also need to find the basic elements of a FOTM claim,
namely material misstatements made with scienter. Historically, these
60
have tended to be statements made in advance of earnings declines.
While the PSLRA did not result in a decrease in the number of actions
61
62
filed, its heightened pleading rule did cause plaintiffs to choose

57

This is a function of the damage calculation practice detailed in subsection
I.A.2, infra. Cornerstone Research periodically reports on the declines in FOTM defendants’ stock prices during class periods. The numbers are part of a description of
current plaintiffs’ behavior patterns. Cornerstone reports that there were 176 class
action filings in 2010 and 168 filings in 2009. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31,
at 3. In 2010, the aggregate decline in market capitalization during the class periods
for the subject companies was $474 billion; in 2009, the decline was $550 billion. Id. at
26 fig.25. Market capitalization losses during the two days flanking the last day of these
actions’ class periods—losses that make the companies good candidates to meet the
loss causation requirement—were $72 billion for the 2010 filings and $84 billion for
the 2009 filings. Id. at 24 fig.23.
58
Steven J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1497-98 (2006).
59
See Irene Kim & Douglas J. Skinner, Measuring Securities Litigation Risk 16
( June 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632638
(noting that larger firms are sued at higher rates). Target industries, however, shift
over time with market volatility. Technology companies were the lead targets a decade
ago; in recent years, financial and health care companies have displaced them. See
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 18 fig.18 (finding that 18.2% of filings in
2001 targeted technology companies while financial and health care companies comprised 25.7% of new filings in 2010).
60
Professors Thompson and Sale report a median earnings price drop of 54% as
well as a focus on accounting and earnings management misstatements in 88% of the
complaints filed in a one-year period. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities
Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 893, 89798 (2003). The 2010 filings follow this pattern: 93% of the complaints alleged misrepresentations in financial documents; 45% alleged false forward-looking statements; and
26% alleged Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) violations. The 2009
filings for the same categories were as follows: 87%, 45%, and 26%, respectively.
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 32. Interestingly, announced restatements
are becoming less salient as triggers, implicated in 7% of 2010 complaints and 8% of
2009 complaints, as compared with 34% in 2006. Id.
61
See, e.g., Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1001, 1003 fig.1 (2003) (showing that the number of federal court filings returned to previous levels one year after Congress enacted the PSLRA); see also Choi &
Thompson, supra note 58, at 1496-97 (noting that “the number of federal suits quickly
returned to near its pre-PSLRA level” after Congress foreclosed such litigation in state
courts). Bajaj and his colleagues also show that the settlement rate dropped substantially over the same time frame, while the time between filing and settlement has in-
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their targets more carefully. Plaintiffs now look for “hard evidence,”
typified by misstatements in company financials as well as SEC en63
forcement actions.
Thus briefed, let us hypothesize a typical fraud-on-the-market
case. Assume that high-level actors at Ajax Corporation cause it to incorrectly apply Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
with the result that Ajax overstates its earnings across seven fiscal quarters beginning on January 1, 201X and ending after the third quarter
of 201Y. Ajax announces on January 2, 201Z that it will be restating its
earnings for the preceding seven quarters, that its 201Y annual report
will be delayed, and that the ex post quarterly earnings reductions will
be between ten and thirty percent. Ajax’s stock, which has been trading upward during the two years in question, beginning at forty dollars and ending at sixty dollars, drops forty percent on the date of the
restatement announcement, closing at thirty-six dollars. In this hypothetical, the January 2 corrective disclosure is the only possible cause
of the price drop.
A plaintiffs’ law firm promptly files a class action complaint. The
complaint defines the class as all purchasers of Ajax stock from January 1, 201X to December 31, 201Y, who continued to hold stock on
January 2, 201Z, and claims out-of-pocket damages for each member

creased. Bajaj et al., supra, at 1009 tbls.3 & 4, 1010. But see Choi & Thompson, supra
note 58, at 1498 (reporting that the settlement rate is the same, but the time to reach
settlement has increased). Evidence on the rate of dismissal is mixed. See id. at 1498 &
nn. 54-56 (providing an overview of several studies that have reached different conclusions about dismissals).
62
PSLRA § 21D(b)(1)–(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006) (requiring plaintiff to specify each statement, the reasons why each statement is allegedly misleading,
and to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind”).
63
See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON & ORG. 598, 601, 613-22 (2006) (defining “hard evidence” as
a public announcement made before a filing in response to an accounting restatement
or an SEC action, and finding support for these actions in an analysis of all initial public offerings between 1990 and 1999). Choi also suggests that the PSLRA disproportionately and negatively impacts non-nuisance litigation that lacks prefiling hard evidence. Id. at 614-16; see also Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do
the Merits Matter More? Class Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 636 (2007) (finding a sharp increase in litigation grounded in
accounting restatements following the introduction of the PSLRA); A.C. Pritchard &
Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 146 (2005) (finding that revenue-related accounting violations and other GAAP allegations are negatively correlated with dismissals in the Second Circuit but not in the Ninth Circuit).
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at the difference between the inflated price paid for the stock on the
purchase date and its lower, intrinsic value on the date of filing.
2. The Value Line
One part of the damage calculation is easy. The class members’
respective purchase prices are objectively determined by the record of
market prices. In contrast, the lower intrinsic values on each purchase
date are hidden. These values, like the market price itself, will have
changed dynamically across the two-year period along with the fortunes of the company and the conditions in the wider economy. In
theory, for any class member who purchased at a particular time,
there is a “correct” per-share damages calculation based on the intrinsic value of Ajax at the moment of purchase. This would be the market price minus one share’s allocation of the present value of Ajax’s
future net cash flows projected based on accurate public information
about Ajax and discounted based on then-prevailing economic condi64
tions. But, unfortunately, this theoretically correct damages calculation does not facilitate the pleading and proof requirements of a class
action lawsuit. Primary evidence of intrinsic value, such as one sees
presented in an appraisal action, requires analysis of specific facts
65
about the company, its prospects, and outside markets. This evi66
dence is expensive to generate and tends to be indeterminate. Generating and marshalling such evidence day-by-day across a class period
would be practically impossible and would chill class action antifraud
67
enforcement, much as would an actual reliance requirement.

64

Thus the intrinsic value of the stock will change dynamically across time, just as
the market price does.
65
See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1021, 1041-43 (2009) (describing the components of the going-concern value approach in appraisal, which includes the present
value of earnings based on current assets and “the present value of the firm’s growth
opportunities”).
66
For additional information on indeterminacy, see infra note 69 and accompanying text.
67
Commentators have dismissed the fundamental value approach as unduly speculative. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 17 (1982) (“Attempting to appraise
the value of the security by analyzing asset value, earnings data, and other information
is inherently speculative.”). Others contend that traditional fundamental-value evidence fails to meet the admissibility standard of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993), which outlines reliability indicators a judge should
use when determining whether to admit expert scientific testimony. See Esther
Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coef-
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Happily for class action plaintiffs, they do not need to show fun68
damental value. Instead, litigation experts use models that focus on
market-price changes without an anchor in fundamental-value calculations. This exercise begins on the corrective disclosure date with the
pre- and post-disclosure prices: here, sixty and thirty-six dollars. The
latter is taken as Ajax’s post-disclosure intrinsic value. The analysis
then works backward, comparing the thirty-six-dollar figure against
the stock market for the two-year class period to construct Ajax’s per
share intrinsic value at every date in the period. Two price lines
emerge: a “market” line tracking Ajax’s actual stock price and a constructed “value” line. The numbers on the constructed-value line
purportedly determine the company’s per share intrinsic value at all
times during the class period. The difference between the stock-price
line and the value line is the price inflation caused by the fraud.
The value line is created using an asset-pricing model, which is
based on empirical stock-return data from a prior period during
which the fraud did not impact Ajax’s stock price. The model articulates risk and return relationships between the return on Ajax’s stock
and two other factors—the return on the stock market as a whole (the
capital asset pricing model’s beta factor) and the return on Ajax’s industry group. The mathematical relationships, thus captured, provide
a basis for inferring what the returns on Ajax stock would have been
without the fraud. Ultimately, the exercise yields intrinsic values for
69
each day in the class period.
More precisely, the model yields proxies for intrinsic values. It
would take a huge leap of faith to support a stronger assertion about
the accuracy of calculations generated by such a two-factor asset pricing model. Results vary greatly depending on the particular asset pric70
ing model employed, and there are several such models. Further, the

ficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 12-13 (2009) (presenting the common perception that expert
testimony not grounded in event studies is “junk science” that is appropriately “replaced with expert testimony based on the generally agreed-upon notion that a properly performed event study is an appropriate method for estimating damages in shareholder class action litigation”).
68
The practice dates back to Judge Sneed’s concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp. See 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing the creation of price
and value lines to determine damages for each class member).
69
See Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 897-98 (1990) (describing the steps
used to calculate a value line using the comparable index approach discussed above).
70
See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1491-92 (1996) (describing the value line approach and noting
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evidence shows that one component of the model used in FOTM
cases—the capital pricing model (CAPM)—is inaccurate for most time
71
periods. CAPM is still used in empirical finance simply because it is
the best model available. But we are left in an awkward evidentiary
spot: even if it were safe to assume that the stock price accurately reflected Ajax’s fundamental value on the start and finish dates, confidence in the calculation for intermediate dates is very low.
Confidence respecting the start and end dates will be higher, but
not necessarily by much. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
72
(ECMH) that underlies Basic’s presumption of reliance on marketpricing integrity does not predict that the stock price reflects fundamental value. In its semi-strong state, it simply says that “no trading
strategy based on public information can regularly outperform the
73
market.” Alternatively stated, ECMH stands for the principle that
even if the stock is mispriced on any given date (based on any capital
asset trading model), the misalignment may get worse before it finally
is corrected in the future. In sum, FOTM damage calculations spin
numbers based on a set of weak assumptions. And the problems with
the damage calculation in our hypothetical case have only just started.
3. Complicating Factors
The hypothetical strives for simplicity by stipulating that the
twenty-four-dollar price drop stems entirely from the corrective disclo74
sure and reflects no other influences. But there will be complications even with that stipulation. Direct application of the asset-pricing
model does not always yield plausible day-to-day figures. For example,
the price effect of the series of earnings misstatements may have cumulated over time, with the impact differing across class members de75
pending on the time of stock purchase. We will surmount this barthat “the value line calculations of the experts for the two sides can differ greatly, even
when they are using the same methodology”).
71
See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 196-99
(10th ed. 2011) (presenting a hypothetical scenario showing the model’s inaccuracy
and concluding that “[t]here is no doubt that the evidence on the [model] is less convincing than scholars once thought”).
72
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
73
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 692 (2010).
74
See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 69, at 893-94 (describing the calculative problem presented by multiple risks and multiple disclosure dates).
75
See Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 67, at 14 (mentioning the difficulty associated with apportioning damages from securities class action lawsuits among multiple
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rier with a further assumption: the average price inflation across the
two-year period is twelve dollars, and it is normally distributed.
We may still be overstating the damages, however. When a company restates its financials, there may be collateral damage in the form
76
of market reappraisal of its managers’ capabilities. Given this effect,
the forty-percent decline in the stock price may outstrip the funda77
mental-value implications of the accounting adjustment taken alone.
Let us assume that no collateral damage exists and estimate a
damage figure for the class. Assume that Ajax has twenty million
shares outstanding, and that its market share turnover is one-hundred
percent per year. How many shares are in the class? Things get tricky
at this point. The class members are those who bought Ajax stock
during the class period and continue to hold it at the period’s end; inand-out traders are excluded. If Ajax’s one-hundred-percent turnover
stems from activity respecting only ten percent of its shares, each of
which is traded ten times annually, then the class will be comprised of
the holders of ten percent of the stock. In contrast, if Ajax’s share
turnover involved a complete repopulation of its shareholder group
across the two years, then one-hundred percent of Ajax’s shares will be
in the class. Unfortunately, because the connection between daily
stock-trading volume figures and corporate stockholder lists is
opaque, no verifiable figures are available.

co-defendants due to the challenge of assigning specific misrepresentations to individual co-defendants).
76
Studies have provided empirical confirmation of this assertion. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (analyzing 585 enforcement actions brought between 1978
and 2002 and finding that reputational impairment accounted for approximately sixtyseven percent of the decline in a firm’s stock price following the announcement of the
misconduct); see also, e.g., Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and
Securities Litigation, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 717, 723-27 (providing several examples of reputational harm as “collateral damage” from negative disclosures); Allen Ferrell & Atanu
Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW. 163, 168-70 (2007) (identifying
“confounding events” that cause a stock’s intraday price drop following negative disclosure but are unrelated to the disclosure itself).
77
It is not at all clear within Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336
(2005), that the misstatements will be deemed to have caused this additional loss. See
Cornell & Rutten, supra note 76, at 744-45 (noting the difficulty of considering collateral damages under a loss-causation framework); Ferrell & Saha, supra note 76, at 17578 (discussing the impact postcorrective disclosure stock-price rebounds have on damages valuation).
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Plaintiffs accordingly proceed inferentially and deploy experts
78
who apply controversial models. To surmount this problem in our
79
hypothetical, we must add another assumption: fifty percent of Ajax
stockholders, holding a total of ten million shares, purchased of all
their stock during the class period. Using the average loss, this yields
a damage figure of $120 million.
Our simple hypothetical thus turns out to be rather complicated.
In the real world, the situation will be more complicated still, for factors unrelated to the fraud will also have an impact on the stock price

78

The plaintiffs start with daily volume numbers and then differentiate between
traded and untraded shares. Within the group of untraded shares, all buyers who sold
the stock before the corrective disclosure date are eliminated. The models employed
in this exercise are much disputed. See DANIEL R. FISCHEL ET AL., NAT’L LEGAL CTR.
FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, THE USE OF TRADING MODELS TO ESTIMATE AGGREGATE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION: AN UPDATE 7-21 (2006) (criticizing the models
and making an empirical showing of their tendency to overestimate damages); Linda
Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in Calculating Damages for Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 BUS. LAW. 955, 955 (2007) (“Current modeling practice by damages experts
may fail to meet [Daubert] standards.”); Linda Allen, A New Theoretically-Grounded Microstructure Trading Model for Calculating Damages in Shareholder Class Action Litigation?, 12
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 61, 62-65 (2006) (criticizing current models for using “aggregate
trade volume” as their base and proposing a substitute based on “the net purchases of
shares . . . on each day of the Class Period”); Michael Barclay & Frank C. Torchio, A
Comparison of Trading Models Used for Calculating Aggregate Damages in Securities Litigation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 105, 117-18 (criticizing models in
use as being highly inaccurate); John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved TwoTrader Model for Measuring Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 213, 250-51 (2003) (finding fault with current models and proposing a more
consistent substitute).
Damage calculation is in flux at all events. The “proportional trading” model that
plaintiffs have long preferred has been rejected by one court for insufficient scientific
support. See Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 95-1069, 2000 WL 1506892, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 21, 2000) (finding that the proportional trading model fails to satisfy Daubert requirements). But see RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., No. 94-5587, 2000
WL 420548, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2000) (“Surely, every stock pricing model will be
subject to some form of statistical criticism or unwanted interpretation.”). For criticism of the Kaufman opinion and a defense of the model, see Brian P. Murray & Eric J.
Belfi, The Proportionate Trading Model: Real Science or Junk Science?, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
391, 403-12 (2004). A newer replacement model has been questioned by another
court. See In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 02-0030, 2005 WL 1403756, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. June 3, 2005) (casting doubt on the two-trader model after an extensive evidentiary hearing but, because of the facts of the case, deciding not to rule on rejection). A
third court has rejected the concept of aggregate damages entirely. See Bell v. FORE
Sys., Inc., No. 97-1265, 2002 WL 32097540, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2002) (theorizing that the PSLRA’s limitation on damages contemplates individual plaintiffs with
individual claims).
79
See FISCHEL ET AL., supra note 78, at 28-29 (suggesting that the question of damages be addressed during claims administration).
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80

during the class period. Such “confounding” information comes in
81
different shapes and sizes. The corrective disclosure could have revealed additional bad news about Ajax’s prospects unrelated to its past
financial reports. Thus, the stock price decline might stem both from
the restatement and from the effect of additional bad news. Alternatively, Ajax might have bundled good news with its corrective disclosure.
Or the market may have anticipated the accounting news over time,
82
drawing inferences from past reported events. There are even cases
where it is not at all clear that the corrective disclosure played any role
83
in the stock-price decline, or so the defendants argue. Defendants
also argue that market prices can negatively overreact to disclosures of
84
bad news, and that event studies do not filter out these effects.
Analysts agree that event-study methodology should be employed
to sort out the different influences on the market price’s response to
85
the corrective disclosure. But, in line with the state of empirical fi86
nance theory, there are wide differences in the methodology’s application. Indeed, these analysts debate matters as fundamental as
choosing the appropriate event study models for the securities litiga87
tion context. Moreover, as confounding information accumulates, it

80

See Alexander, supra note 70, at 1491 (noting that variation among experts is
common value-line calculation).
81
For a discussion of confounding events, see Ferrell & Saha, supra note 76, at
168-70.
82
This may, but need not, result from the company’s strategic conduct; the good
news may be part and parcel of the corrective facts disclosed. See Cornell & Rutten,
supra note 76, at 719-20 (providing a common example of a corrective disclosure—a
merger announcement—that “over-discloses” the prior misstatement); see also Janet
Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1421, 1425-27 (1994) (noting that an announcement of new product opportunities overdisclosed a prior misstatement and arguing that using the disclosure as a measure of
price effect is flawed because it ignores the fact that investors often have distinct reasons
for paying less for stocks after the disclosure that are unrelated to the disclosure itself).
83
See Alexander, supra note 70, at 1425-26 (describing the stark contrast between
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ stated positions in securities class action litigations).
84
See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 180 (arguing that event studies fail to provide an accurate picture of a
security’s value “because noise and sentiment can influence price”). A provision of the
PSLRA that limits damages ameliorates this problem. PLSRA § 21D(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(e) (2006).
85
For a description of the methodology, see Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 67,
at 16-24.
86
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
87
See Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies 2
(Robert Day Sch., Working Paper No. 2009-17, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
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becomes necessary to resort to old-fashioned financial analysis and
make judgment calls about how investors would have responded to
88
counterfactual scenarios: it is one thing to confirm a corrective disclosure’s pricing impact with an event study, but quite another to
show the ex ante market value of the undisclosed information consid89
ered in isolation. In the end, despite the apparently determinative
character of the financial techniques brought to bear, we wind up in
the well-known territory where lawyers in high stakes litigation make
90
legal arguments based on uncertain information.
B. Pocket Shifting
On whom have the losses, thus calculated, fallen? The quantum of
economic loss that Ajax stock purchasers experienced is much smaller
than the foregoing damage calculation seems to indicate. And who
funds the compensatory check? Shareholders supposedly protected by
the cause of action. Therein lie policy problems for FOTM.
To return to the first question, note that every buyer in the Ajax
class had a seller who benefitted from the price inflation, but who,
having made no misstatement, may walk away with the inflated price
in his pocket. Accordingly, within this group of buyers and sellers
91
there is no net loss, only a wealth transfer between innocent parties.
This scenario raises the question of whether FOTM litigation should
function as an insurance scheme for buyers left holding the short end
of the stick. The answer is no. The loss is not actually spread across a

abstract=1442222 (criticizing single-firm event studies as having an antiplaintiff bias
and proposing a different methodology).
88
See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 69, at 896-97, 911 (noting that finance theory
requires estimating investor assessments). There are also numerous calculative questions arising from Dura. For a review, see Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
199, 213-21 (2009).
89
See Alexander, supra note 82, at 1427 (discussing the problems with using event
studies to calculate damages, including the difficulty of separating a disclosure’s market effect from the “litigation-related component”).
90
See id. at 1458 (arguing that damages calculated from event studies are uncertain, which has an impact on multiple levels of litigation proceedings); see also Abby F.
Rudzin, Loss Causation and Damage Defense Strategies (describing the challenges of countering the “expert opinions” of plaintiffs’ experts who do not rely on “mathematical or
statistical analysis” in making those opinions at trial), in WILLIAM R. MAGUIRE ET AL.,
MANAGING SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS 45, 51-52 (2009).
91
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 651 (1985) (describing how “trading in the aftermarket entails
offsetting gains and losses”).

BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

94

11/17/2011 6:02 PM

[Vol. 160: 69

larger class of insured actors, as it would be in the case of casualty in92
surance. With Ajax, we have a plaintiff class holding fifty percent of
the shares seeking compensation from a corporation owned by the
holders of one-hundred percent of the shares. To the extent that a
shareholder in the class remains an Ajax shareholder at the time the
93
compensation is paid, its pro rata contribution is a wash. In effect,
then, those Ajax shareholders who are not in the class pay the dam94
ages. The loss is shifted, but not really spread.
At this point, we need to sort out Ajax shareholders’ pecuniary interests according to shareholder type. Drawing on basic financial
economics for a model, we break them into two categories: (1) fully diversified portfolio shareholders and (2) underdiversified shareholders.
The latter category in turn is broken into three subcategories: (a) uninformed traders, (b) long-term investors, and (c) information traders.
1. Modern Portfolio Investors
Many (and we would guess most) of Ajax’s shareholders, both in95
side and outside of the class, will be modern portfolio investors.
These shareholders accept the tenets of finance theory, fully diversify
their portfolios, measure returns based on the wider market, and
avoid trading on company-specific information. These investors’
trades are either liquidity-driven or incidental to their portfolio man96
agement. Accordingly, they can be expected, on average, to be on the
selling end of price-inflated stock trades fifty percent of the time and on
97
the buying end fifty percent of the time. Their gains and losses will
net out over time as their diversified status, in effect, insures them

92

See Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations when Issuers Do Not
Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 304-05 (“[T]he persons who will ultimately bear these
losses—the shareholders at the time the suit is brought—are unlikely to be any more
diversified than the persons who initially incur [them]. . . . [T]hese losses are spread
among the holders of all the issuer’s shares, which . . . is a larger group.”).
93
See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1557 (illustrating that shareholders bear the burden
of any judgment or settlement).
94
See Fox, supra note 92, at 308 (arguing that shifting losses creates social costs).
95
See generally BREALEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 186-88 (providing a basic background of modern portfolio theory).
96
See id. at 188-90.
97
See Alexander, supra note 70, at 1500-03 (“The chance of being on the losing or
winning side of a transaction . . . can be assumed to be random.”).
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98

against price inflation. It thus makes no sense for these shareholders
to pay an additional insurance premium in the form of litigation costs.
These costs mount up. Plaintiffs’ attorneys take an average of
99
twenty-three percent of each settlement. Corporate defense attorneys, whom companies pay directly, add an additional cost of at least
100
twenty-five to thirty-five percent over and above the settlement costs.
In addition, there are the costs of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) in101
surance premiums and the ancillary costs of disrupted business.
These factors imply that litigation costs may exceed the settlement
proceeds directed to the class members. It is thus unsurprising that
class action filings are associated with immediate declines in company
102
stock prices.
To summarize, diversified portfolio investors emerge undamaged
but for the litigation costs. It is still theoretically possible that a given
investor institution could come out slightly ahead if its net proceeds
from litigation settlements exceed its pro rata share of litigation costs,
but that seems unlikely as a practical matter. Professors Cox and
Thomas collected distribution data on 118 settlements and found
98

See id. (noting that investors who make more trades are more likely to have their
gains equal their losses).
99
This is the mean percentage recovery in securities cases for the period 1993 to
2008 described in Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses
in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 245, 258 (2010).
Figures for earlier periods tend to be higher. See, e.g., Denise N. Martin et al., Recent
Trends IV: What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 121, 141 (1999) (showing a recovery of thirty-two percent from 1991 to 1998).
100
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1815 n.95 (2007).
101
See Fox, supra note 92, at 306-07 (discussing additional costs of securities litigation compensation, including lawyers’ fees, expert costs, “the time and attention of issuers’ executives required by litigation, the administrative costs associated with D&O
insurance, and the use of scarce judicial resources”); cf. Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 643-44 (asserting that a CEO is better suited to bear risk than the
company, and thus, the CEO should be liable).
102
See ANJAN THAKOR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 4-5 (2005), available at http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docid=857; Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 67-68 (1991).
This picture has been confirmed empirically, but with a wrinkle. Thakor collected
data documenting institutional investor positions in the stock of 755 companies that
settled cases filed between 1995 and 2005 and tracking the investors’ gains and losses
on inflated stock. See ANJAN V. THAKOR WITH JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & DAVID A. GULLEY,
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION 8 (2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
get_ilr_doc.php?docid=855 (accounting for a slight trading loss by reference to share
issuance activity by the defendant companies).
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that, on average, only twenty-eight percent of eligible institutional in103
They account for this behavior by
vestors bothered to file claims.
referring both to some institutions’ collective interest in maintaining a
posture of loyalty to corporate managers and to informational break104
downs within the chain of market intermediaries. Those institutions
that do file claims direct the proceeds either to the particular portfolio that bore the loss or to their general fund. Accordingly, fund
beneficiaries who exited during the (usually) long period between the
corrective disclosure date and the settlement payment receive nothing
105
from the settlement.
2. Underdiversified Investors
We now consider investors who buy and hold stocks in underdiversified portfolios. Because these investors forego diversification’s insurance against price inflation damage, they are candidates for FOTM
compensation. An objection to their compensation should be noted,
106
however. Basic Inc. v. Levinson assumes the ECMH, and the ECMH’s
107
primary advice to investors is to diversify fully. Thus, an investor who
chooses to forego diversification to pursue informational (or other) advantages is outside of the ECMH, and is thus arguably outside the class
that the FOTM presumption protects.
We will waive this objection, however, and proceed by dividing the
underdiversified investors into three groups: (a) uninformed traders,
(b) long-term investors, and (c) information traders. It turns out that a
clear policy case for compensation can be made only for the last group.
a. Uninformed Traders
Uninformed traders—also known as “noise traders”—buy and sell
stocks at random; their trades lack an informational basis and are not

103

Cox & Thomas, supra note 1, at 424.
See id. at 427, 431-33 (stating that many large financial institutions refuse to
file claims against their clients and noting that investors often do not receive notice
of claims).
105
See id. at 449.
106
485 U.S. 224, 246 & n.24 (1988).
107
If one cannot make systematic profits trading on public information, and investors are compensated only for bearing systematic risk, there would be no other rational
strategy. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 91-93
(6th ed. 2008); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 692 (“[N]o trading strategy based
on public information . . . can outperform the market . . . .”).
104
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Because these noisy
based on a system of portfolio management.
trades occur randomly as the traders buy and sell both under- and
overpriced stocks, gains and losses cancel out over time, which under109
cuts the policy case for compensation.
b. Long-term Investors
Underdiversified investors who hold Ajax stock over the long term
and who trade only rarely emerge in a different posture. Some of
them could be outsiders saving for retirement. But most are probably
Ajax insiders: officers and employees holding shares vested under
equity-compensation schemes. Any shareholders from management
who sold during the class period can be expected to be named as defendants with respect to their sales and can be put to one side. The rest
110
are the clear losers in the federal securities litigation game. They pay
their pro rata share of Ajax’s litigation costs, but those who bought before the class date will be entirely on the defending side and will receive
nothing from any settlement. Moreover, because long-term holders do
not trade often, they receive little benefit from price-inflated stock.
There is an irony here: this is the category containing any mom-andpops in Ajax’s shareholder group, and the system picks their pockets.
c. Underdiversified Information Traders
To the extent that FOTM can be defended as a compensatory
mechanism, the basis lies with this group. These are the investment
professionals (and, by extension, market intermediaries) who invest in
analysis of publicly available information when making investment de111
Critically, this is also the only group whose members actucisions.
ally relied on Ajax’s public statements.
These shareholders, although underdiversified, can buy and sell
stocks very quickly. Accordingly, we situate most of them on the plaintiff side, as they have purchased and held Ajax stock within the class
108

For a general discussion of noise trading as an alternative to the efficient markets approach, see Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach
to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 19-31.
109
Cf. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 3 (2000) (describing noise traders’ gains and losses as portrayed in orthodox financial economics).
110
See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1560 (describing the underdiversified retirement
savers as the “clearest losers”).
111
We put aside the question, raised by the ECMH, of whether these informational investments can yield a positive long-term return.
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period but have since moved on. Of course, some shareholders may
have held the stock through the disclosure date, thus creating an interest in both sides of the litigation. However, we find it hard to imagine that an appreciable number of these investors will be situated only
on the payor side.
Note that this group includes a subset of investors who make addi112
tional investments in verifying the accuracy of public information.
Those who investigated Ajax stock during the class period and made
the right call will have been amply rewarded by selling (whether from
a long or short position) when the stock was overvalued. Those who
investigated and made the wrong call will be in the plaintiff class, despite their skepticism.
This group has a strong claim for compensatory solicitude. These
investors make a double investment: once in the cost of generating
113
information and once in the foregone benefit of full diversification.
At the same time, their informational investments yield a public
114
benefit in the form of more accurate securities prices. In order to
receive this public benefit, we arguably need to compensate the in115
vestors’ reliance interest.
Although this argument might be persuasive in a frictionless world
where those who actually rely on public information could instantly
and costlessly liquidate their fraud claims into the full amount of
damages suffered, FOTM does not work that way. To illustrate this
point, assume that 5% of the holders in the Ajax class (500,000
shares) fall into this category, and their average damages are $12 per
share, for a total of $6 million. Assume further that the class action
settles three years after filing, which has been the average settlement
112

It is not clear whether this makes sense. Under FOTM, those who actually relied but did not investigate end up sharing the recovery with the skeptics and the liquidity traders who do not suffer any damages. For an analysis of the relative positions
of the two types of informed investors under FOTM, see Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 636-41 (1992).
113
See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 333, 347 (“Informed traders . . . incur the costs of research. . . . And they incur, disproportionately, the costs of securities fraud because, relying on firm-specific disclosure to trade, they are more likely than diversified investors to be net losers.”).
114
See id. at 342 (“Accurate share prices enable performance-based compensation
structures to provide more precise incentives. They ensure that share buybacks and
repurchases do not unfairly discriminate among shareholders, and that option grants
do not dilute existing ownership interests. Finally, accurate share prices facilitate discipline through the takeover market.”).
115
See id. at 348 (arguing in favor of the compensation of informed traders “because
their reliance-based investment strategy provides a corporate-governance externality”).
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116

The median settlement
time since the passage of the PSLRA.
amount for FOTM actions in the $50 to $124 million range for the
117
period 1996 to 2009 is 5.3% of estimated damages. The information
118
traders accordingly recover $318,000 before attorneys’ fees.
Of
course, the number of information traders varies by company and
over time. Even larger numbers result if 25% of the Ajax class falls
into this category: $30 million total damages claimed for a settlement
return of $1.59 million.
Either way, the returns are chump change. Many investors in this
group are hedge funds. They will have reported this loss to their investors and reduced their returns three years earlier, possibly suffering
119
Recouping 5%
consequences in the form of capital withdrawals.
three years later does nothing to backstop the funds’ reliance or to
120
encourage them to continue to invest in information.

116

See ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 2 (2009), available at http://
www.cornerstone.com/Securities-class-action-settlements2009-review-and-analysis-03-242010 (follow “Securities Class Action Settlements: 2009 Review and Analysis” hyperlink
under “Related Documents”) (“[S]ettlements typically occur[] three years after filing.”). Since 2006, the average settlement time has increased to three-and-a-half to
four years. Id.
117
RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 5.
118
Id. at 18 n.5.
119
See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets: Long Term
Results 8-9 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 10-17, 2010)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677517 (describing investor flight from the
hedge fund, Pirate Capital, following portfolio reverses).
120
The information traders do have a means of increasing their return. In recent
years, a number of institutions have opted out of FOTM class actions and brought parallel direct actions in state courts. Historically such actions have been rare. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1550 (2004) (surveying
consumer class actions filed between 1993 and 2003 and reporting an opt-out rate of
less than 0.2%). The recent shift occurred after the PSLRA created a role for institutional investors in the selection of class attorneys. Public pension funds have emerged
in the lead role, and these funds have developed loyalties to particular law firms. Optouts occur when the fund’s preferred firm fails to win the counsel designation. The
law firm then initiates a parallel action in a friendly state court, sometimes even waiting
for the settlement to be announced before opting out. The defendant corporations
tend to settle the parallel actions along with the action in chief. As a result, the institutional plaintiffs win larger settlement percentages than do the class plaintiffs. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
288, 317-18 (2010) (“Possibly, the defendants recognize that large, well-financed optouts will simply not allow their counsel to settle cheaply and thus prefer to settle these
cases outside the class action.”).
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C. Summary, Analysis, and Implications
Commentators have been making the central points in the fore121
going discussion for many years. We know of no academic writer who
controverts them. The resulting implications for FOTM are devastating.
1. The Failure of the Compensation Justification
and Actual Reliance
FOTM is supposed to compensate shareholders for damages, but
it fails in two ways. First, the shareholders bear the costs of the payments. Most cases settle within D&O insurance-policy limits, and the
corporation, as opposed to the named individual defendants, still pays
122
Nothing dictates this practice.
when the limits are exceeded.
Boards of directors could require contributions from individual defendants, or courts could reject settlements for lack of individual contributions. But the system continues to endorse collectivized funding
123
in all but a handful of cases.
The second failure concerns the amounts paid. As we have seen,
shareholders recover only a fraction of their losses. FOTM actions
start with whopping price-inflation figures extrapolated by statistical
experts. But the proceedings never yield the stated sums because litigation to final judgment is not cost effective from the lawyers’ point of

121

The critique of FOTM reached maturity with Professors Arlen and Carney, as
well as with Mahoney. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 55, at 730 (arguing that FOTM
cases are not appropriate for the imposition of vicarious liability on offenders); Mahoney,
supra note 112, at 656 (proposing FOTM’s rejection based on the argument that FOTM
will lead to underdeterrence of securities fraud and underenforcement of current laws);
see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 635 (originating elements of the analysis).
122
See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., RECENT
TRENDS III: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? 9 (1995)
(showing that insurers pay an average of 68.2%, defendant companies 31.4%, and individuals 0.4% of settlement amounts).
123
There have been a few spectacular cases in which top officers have made significant payments—Global Crossing, WorldCom, Adelphia—but they are exceptions.
See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1551-53 (noting that officer payment cases tend to involve
insolvent corporations, individual defendants who promise to make restitution to avoid
indictment, or an inadequate or rescinded D&O policy). Outside directors have almost never been held liable. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1068 (2006) (finding thirteen settlements involving out-of-pocket payments by outside directors among the hundreds of settlements reached between 1991
and 2004). The famous exception involved the WorldCom board, whose members contributed twenty percent of their respective net worths. See Coffee, supra note 54, at 155253. Alan Hevesi, the former New York state comptroller, insisted on this result. See Gretchen Morgenson, Ex-Directors at WorldCom Settle Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at C1.
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124

view. These large, complicated, and risky lawsuits provoke risk aver125
If the action is dismissed, the
sion on the part of those in charge.
law firm fronting the capital to develop the case loses its entire investment. The further the law firm goes in pursuing the claimed
damages, the larger its investment in the suit, the less likely a settlement, and the greater the risk of loss in court due to evidentiary shortcomings or adverse findings of law. Indeed, one of the most striking
features of FOTM jurisprudence is the absence of case law on damage
calculations. Law is created only on issues that go to the complaint’s
threshold validity, resulting in a mountain of case law on loss causation,
developed on motions to dismiss, and next to nothing on loss itself. As
a result, “compensation” in the FOTM world comes down to numbers
generated solely to provide parameters for settlement discussions.
There is a further irony. Suppose the securities litigation bar
found it cost effective to go the distance. In the Ajax hypothetical,
that would mean a judgment approaching $120 million—one-sixth of
the company’s equity capitalization as of the corrective disclosure
date. Such a payment presumably would have a material adverse impact on the current shareholders. Were such payments to be made by
126
a large number of companies, the resulting injuries to shareholders
would make FOTM a pressing economic and political problem. The
shareholder class itself would demand—and secure—its elimination.
In sum, FOTM’s compensation justification makes no sense. Only
a subset of shareholders arguably needs compensation, and private litigation is incapable of generating it. At the same time, even if FOTM

124

Since the PSLRA’s enactment, only twenty-two securities actions have gone to
trial. Seven of those cases were settled before a verdict. Of the fifteen that went as far
as a verdict, the defendants won ten and the plaintiffs five. Adam T. Savett, RiskMetrics Grp., Securities Class Action Trials in the Post-PSLRA Era ( Jan. 2010) (unpublished presentation), available at http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/SCAS%
20Trials.pdf.
125
See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1543-44 (detailing the risk-conscious behavior of
plaintiffs’ attorneys and corporate actors before commencing securities class actions).
126
Between 1996 and 2010, 2.4% of listed companies had a complaint filed against
them. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 12. But even this small percentage
encompasses a large number of complaints: between 1996 and 2009, a total of 2372
complaints were filed against listed companies. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION FILINGS—2009: A YEAR IN REVIEW 9 fig.8 (2010), available at http://
www.cornerstone.com/Securities_filings_2009_yir (follow “Securities Class Action Filings—2009: A Year in Review” hyperlink). Actions cluster in certain industries in the
wake of statement reversals. In 2002, for example, 22.7% of communications companies and 34.3% of utilities were sued. Id. at 12. In 2008, 32.6% of financial institutions
were sued. Id.
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makes a positive contribution as a fraud deterrent or as a governance
supplement, it survives only because it undercompensates.
The logical conclusion of this analysis is FOTM’s elimination. The
only players with a strong case for compensation are the underdiversified information investors, who also happen to be the only players
who can make out a case of actual reliance.
2. Litigation Incentives
Having suggested FOTM’s elimination, we must confront the
problem of litigation incentives. We have seen that limiting recovery
to investors with reliance interests mitigates some policy problems,
but it may create others. Our hypothetical FOTM action yields a
$6.36 million settlement, which implies an attorney’s fee of $1.46 million, or 23%. While not a jackpot, the figure is certainly large
enough to incentivize litigation.
Cases with smaller out-of-pocket damages can also incentivize litigation. The proportion of claimed damages yielded in settlements
goes up as the claimed damages amount gets smaller. In 2010, settlements of FOTM actions claiming less than $50 million yielded a median of 9.9%, while settlements of cases in the $1 to 5 billion range
127
had an average yield of 1.7%. As it turns out, there is such a thing as
small-numbers securities litigation. Accordingly, there is no reason to
think that private securities enforcement would disappear entirely in a
reliance regime.
Still, at some point the projected yield is so low that the litigation
incentive disappears. Let us reset the Ajax numbers for a reliancebased cause of action. If 5% of the shareholder population consists of
information traders, the implied attorney’s fee for a 5.3% settlement
works out to $73,140. If 25% are information traders, the fee becomes a more attractive $365,700. In either case, a settlement will not
create any appreciable decrease in the level of difficulty and expense
confronting the lawyer as compared to the class action, which offers a
fee of $1.46 million. Indeed, the lawyer would need to prove reliance
for each individual plaintiff, adding to the cost. Reliance could (and
should) be defined liberally, with a focus on institutional research and
analysis practices rather than on particular investment decisions based

127

RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 5 fig.5. Indeed, small-scale settlements
commonly result from FOTM actions. From 1996 to 2009, the median settlement was
approximately $7.6 million. Id. at 2 fig.2.
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on particular information. Even so, the hurdles for an investmentgrade lawsuit do rise substantially.
Some investors may be willing to sue and pick up expenses. Here
the activist hedge funds are the standout candidates. They accumulate large percentage stakes in their targets and, from a governance
128
point of view, surmount the traditional collective-action problem.
129
But there remains
Further, hedge funds have proven ready to sue.
the question whether the nexus of incentives that causes hedge funds
to break the governance mold carries over to antifraud litigation.
They are in the skeptical subset of informed investors. They look for
quickly recoverable value positives and do their best to avoid companies
130
with hidden value negatives. Litigation would remain expensive and
risky, even if reliance were easy to prove and the burden of class qualification were lifted. Moreover, the extended time to payment would discourage investment in litigation in this highly competitive sector.
We suspect that, given a liberal definition of reliance, there would
be a steady stream of private 10b-5 litigation addressed to material
misstatements. But it is clear that the volume of litigation would diminish. The issue is whether the diminution implies a welfare loss for
shareholders or society in general. FOTM could still add value despite
its failure as a compensatory tort.
There are two possible sources of value. First is fraud deterrence,
which is the second pillar of FOTM’s conceptual framework. FOTM
proponents more recently proposed the second possible source, contribution to the corporate governance system, as a substitute justification. We discuss the second justification in Part III.
II. FRAUD ON THE MARKET AS DETERRENCE
Although the courts constructed FOTM as a compensatory tort, its
very existence assumes that the SEC, the public enforcer of securities
laws, needs assistance from the private sector. Thus, there is a possi128

See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375,
1387-90 (2007) (describing the trend toward activist funds taking on more significant
portions of target stock).
129
See id. at 1403-05 (identifying examples that illustrate the willingness of activist
funds to engage in proxy contests).
130
See Christopher Faille, How (Not) to Be an Investor Activist: Object Lessons, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Mar. 6, 2006, available at LEXISNEXIS (search “HedgeWorld Daily
News” database for “Object Lessons”) (citing hedge fund manager Robert Chapman’s
advice that activist investors urging a corporate restructuring should ensure their stock
“has the same characteristics that would make its passive ownership worthwhile”).
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bility that FOTM, even though it cannot be sustained as a compensatory measure, can still be justified on enforcement grounds. This shift
in justificatory emphasis takes us from the private law side of the policy line to the public law side, where one must consider the social cost
of fraud and ask whether FOTM reduces that cost by preventing fraud
131
in the first place.

131

A second mode of social cost justification could also be considered—FOTM
could ameliorate the consequences of fraud by reducing investors’ fraud-protection
costs. This inquiry could also be characterized as externality identification. Either
way, it roughly tracks the compensation analysis in Part I—any cost-reducing effect is a
function of the yield of damage payments and thus a function of FOTM’s performance
as a compensatory vehicle.
This inquiry takes us to the economics of sanctions. It sets the base sanction at the
net harm inflicted on others and then adjusts this figure upwards to reflect the probability of detection and enforcement. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 618; cf.
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997) (advocating “several potentially optimal regimes,” including one that would combine vicarious liability and positive
corporate enforcement duties).
The threshold question for FOTM concerns the calculation of the net harm. An
underdiversified informed trader who suffers a loss might take steps to avoid future
loss by incurring information costs. This is a social cost, as it is cheaper for companies
to tell the truth. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 623; Mahoney, supra note
112, at 630-31; see also A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 939 (1999) (noting
additional costs, such as those borne by nonfraudulent sellers to establish credibility
and distinguish themselves from fraudulent sellers). Portfolio investors, by contrast,
do not have an incentive to take precautions because they are as likely to be on the
right side of the trade as on the wrong side. It could work differently with a noise
trader. However, strictly speaking, a noise trader who responds to a loss by taking
company-specific precautions leaves this category and becomes an informed trader.
From a social-cost perspective, this would not necessarily be bad. Alternatively, the
noise trader might shift to full diversification, which certainly would be good. Finally, a
disappointed noise trader might quit the market altogether. This situation has the negative consequence of reducing market liquidity. But, significantly, the possibility of disappointed exit is part and parcel of noise trading. It happens all the time, whether or
not company misstatements caused the price inflation.
For FOTM to make a positive contribution, it must result in an overall reduction in
social costs. Based on the above analysis, these costs are primarily precautionary or monitoring expenditures by the informed subset of investors. See Mahoney, supra note 112, at
630-31. Let us now see how this works out. First we consider FOTM in a hypothetical
world in which plaintiffs are incented (for whatever reason) to litigate every case to payment of the full amount of damages. Then we look at FOTM in the real world where
cases settle for less than ten cents on the dollar.
In a high payout world, FOTM holds out an award approaching $120 million to the
Ajax purchasers in the class, which is a substantial sum even after subtracting attorneys’
fees. An expectation of such a high payment presumably would lead to a reduction in
precaution costs. But this remains a nonsensical approach to the problem. Paying the
judgment to the entire class—both relying and nonrelying traders who will never invest
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The exercise begins as a justification, but it soon sounds like a
backstop defense. It starts with the assertion that fraud is a persistent
problem because the motivations for fraud are difficult to extinguish.
It follows that fraud is underdeterred in the present environment. At
this point, an objection to FOTM arises: if greater deterrence is required, then the better option is to move away from enterprise liability
to individual liability. But FOTM proponents dismiss the objection as
unpersuasive. An individual liability system that handed out penalties
of sufficient magnitude to attract private enforcers would be draconian and would likely impair the recruitment of talented managers. A
more moderate system of individual liability would remove the deep
pocket from the settlement table and so reduce the incidence of private enforcement, much as would a shift to an actual reliance requirement. As a consequence, fraud, already underdeterred, would
be deterred even less, and its deadweight social cost would increase.
Meanwhile, public enforcement fails to offer an alternative, as it is
hobbled by incompatibility and political opposition.
This Part lays out the particulars of this defense of FOTM. Section
A notes the persistence of fraud. Section B looks at the penalty alternative to enterprise liability and poses the overdeterrence question.
Section C tells the standard story of SEC weakness. Section D de-

in precaution—is unnecessary. We emerge with a mix of under- and over-compensation:
as long as the information traders get less than one hundred cents on the dollar, they still
may invest in precaution, while the corporate defendant pays out a sum greater than the
putatively efficient amount. Note also that to the extent that the corporate defendant is
required to overpay, a perverse effect could follow—overdeterrence of discretionary disclosure. Cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 697-98 (noting that the mandatorydisclosure system makes no attempt to impose a full-disclosure regime); Jonathan L.
Rogers et al., Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation 3-5 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of
Bus., Research Paper No. 09-01, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331608
(showing that more optimistic disclosures attract litigation).
There is an easy way to bring the numbers into an efficient alignment: discard
FOTM and reshape the private right of action as a reliance tort. See Mahoney, supra
note 112, at 636-40 (discussing the differences between a FOTM rule and a reliance
rule and noting that a FOTM rule does little to change investor behavior). Social-cost
analysis, then, takes us to the same spot as the analysis of FOTM as compensation.
We now shift to real world FOTM, where in Ajax’s case the damage pool will be
5.3% of $120 million, or $6.36 million, distributed across the class as a whole. Since
any given information trader’s recovery will be minimal, it is clear that FOTM does
nothing to promote reliance on companies’ public disclosures or to discourage precautionary spending. To the extent that there are cash proceeds, most go to investors
whose losses and gains net out over time, siphoning the recovery away from actors
whose behavior could actually be influenced in welfare-enhancing ways. There is a
compensating benefit—the reduced financial stakes mitigate the risk of perverse effects on disclosure policy. But that is not much of a commendation.
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scribes empirical studies cited by proponents of FOTM as a means of
deterrence, and shows that their defense comes down to a weak assertion: “Well, it still doesn’t make any sense, but it’s all we have.” Section E evaluates this assertion by pointing out that FOTM is not the
only weapon in a growing arsenal of antifraud enforcement tools.
A. Motivations for Fraud
Fraud is indeed a persistent problem. The temptations are built
into corporate capitalism, whether through concealment of bad news
or overblown projection of future success. Managers conceal bad
news to buy time. If an adverse business development leads to employment termination or reduces the value of stock options that are
about to expire, then lying or nondisclosure staves off the day of reckoning. Delay also creates turn-around opportunities, despite the risk
132
Misstatements motivated by unchecked opof enforcement action.
timism are less rational in the face of adverse enforcement consequences, but still can be explained. We live in a shareholder-value era
in which corporate reputation is tied to stock prices. Managers labor
under pressure to talk to the market and tell investors what they want
133
Equity compensation schemes, another product of shareto hear.
holder-value culture, add an additional element of self-interest to the
motivational mix, whether the fraud stems from concealment or over134
Unsurprisingly, option compensation is positively assooptimism.
135
ciated with earnings manipulation and shareholder litigation.

132

See Arlen & Carney, supra note 55, at 701- 03, 724-32 (showing most securities
fraud cases can be described in terms of last-period optimism and that almost twentyfive percent of FOTM companies went into bankruptcy); see also Langevoort, Corporate
Executives, supra note 13, at 635 (“The problem is that executives themselves will not be
deterred from misconduct when their personal gain from perpetrating or concealing
the fraud exceeds the impact they would suffer should the corporation have to pay”).
There is evidence to support the proposition that, in accounting cases, defendant
companies did indeed intentionally manage their earnings. See generally Dain C. Donelson et al., Discontinuities and Earnings Management: Evidence from Restatements
Related to Securities Litigation 26 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465029.
133
See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 473 (2001) (discussing how the
incentive structure can lead managers to make inappropriate disclosures).
134
See Pritchard, supra note 131, at 931-37 (describing fraud as a product of fear,
greed, and “Pollyannaism”).
135
See Lin Peng & Ailsa Röell, Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation, 12 REV. FIN.
141, 166, 170 (2008) (associating a high proportion of option payout with share-
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B. The Penalty Alternative
If fraud is a persistent problem imposing deadweight social costs,
then the antifraud enforcement system arguably needs greater deterrent punch. Redirecting enforcement away from companies and toward individual perpetrators presents an obvious means of improvement.
This solution would also move the system away from
compensatory damages and enterprise liability toward individual penalties. Unfortunately, no one seems able to chart a plausible course
that takes us from here to there.
A line of commentary going back at least to the American Law In136
stitute’s Federal Securities Code of 1978 advocates substituting civil
fines against individuals for out-of-pocket losses charged against cor137
Depending on the size of the company and its level of
porations.
executive pay, a fine capped at $5, $10, $20, or $30 million, or, alternatively, a fine set at a percentage of individual net worth, might be
138
enough to rouse the scruples of a CEO or CFO.
price manipulation and showing upward manipulation of earnings reports during
class periods).
136
See FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(c) (1978) (proposing capped damages for both entity and managerial liability).
137
See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 13, at 657-60 (discussing the merits of a method of quantitative caps on damages and its advantages over the out-ofpocket standard).
138
The shareholders derivative action has been suggested as a model that focuses
on individual liability—it reverses enterprise liability by making the enterprise the
plaintiff and restricts liability to culpable actors. See Richard A. Booth, The Paulson Report Reconsidered: How to Fix Securities Litigation by Converting Class Actions into Issuer Actions, 2 J. SEC. L. REG. & COMPLIANCE 244, 247 (2009) (rejecting civil fines and proposing derivative actions brought by shareholder plaintiffs to recover insiders’ ill-gotten
gains); Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 284 (making damages “payable to the issuer”).
Other proposals for alternate damage calculation focus on the disgorgement of illgotten insider gains. See Adam C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientificAtlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 217, 219 (2008) (proposing that “damages . . . be measured by disgorgement of
unlawful gains”); Booth, supra, at 249 (proposing a disgorgement regime). For a contrasting approach, see Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 284-86. Fox calculates damages using the company’s newly acquired capital during a period of price inflation. Id.
at 285. He would accordingly cap damages in any given year at the amount of capital
invested by the company. Id. He would also eliminate enterprise liability and levy
damages on officers, directors, and add an external certifier modeled on the underwriter of a new issue of securities. Id. at 286.
Specifically, assume that Corporation X had $100 million in total assets at the beginning of the year, capitalized 50% with debt and 50% with equity. X’s equity market
capitalization was $80 million, comprised of 2 million common shares trading at $40
per share. Assume also that X invested $10 million of newly acquired capital during
the year, and that its stock price was inflated by $10 due to material misstatements by
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Even so, setting individual penalties poses a difficult, possibly intractable, trade-off in a system that relies on a private-enforcement supplement. On the one hand, the penalties must generate a damage pool
large enough to attract plaintiffs’ attorneys. On the other hand, if the
increased fines generate sufficient funds to attract private enforcers,
then there may be an inadvertent restriction of private enterprise. Dra139
conian penalties could chill corporate recruitment and risk-taking.
Once the possibility of a chill is acknowledged, enterprise liability
140
emerges in a more positive light. It places the precautionary burden
141
on the company and thus aligns incentives so as to minimize the
possibility of a chill. The company is risk neutral, whereas its individual agents are risk averse. Excess caution due to the fear of securities

its officers. Fox would carve out the damage pool by dividing the amount invested, $10
million, by the $40 stock price. The quotient, here 250,000, is a block of “phantom
shares.” This number is multiplied by the stock-price inflation of $10 to yield a damage pool of $2.5 million.
Now compare FOTM damages for the hypothetical Corporation X. We can construct a figure by stipulating that investors who bought shares during the period held
either 1 million or 500,000 shares at the end of the class period, yielding a price inflation of $10 million or $5 million. Using these numbers, Fox’s damages are indeed
lower. The question is whether the number remains too large to impose on individual
defendants without a risk of overdeterrence. Given these numbers, this appears to be
a problem.
We also question the assertion that earnings retained during a period of price inflation are actually ill-gotten gains. This capital emanates from the sale of goods and
services or other assets, not from the pockets of capital providers. This capital certainly
is not “free” with regard to calculation of the equity-capital cost. Further, price inflation could skew that calculation and cause the company to accept a suboptimal
project. It does not follow that the capital is ill-gotten for purposes of a marketregulation regime.
139
This is the same problem that besets the corporate law duty of care, a problem
that has been resolved in favor of minimizing the penalty risk. See PRINCIPLES OF
CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c), cmt. c–f (1994) (minimizing the risk of penalty by
creating a Business Judgment Rule that provides a number of safe harbors for directors and officers).
140
Some take the view that a tradeoff cannot be effected successfully. For example, Professor Coffee proposes that we retain enterprise liability but tweak FOTM to
incent plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring individual defendants to the settlement table as contributors. More particularly, he would offer a bounty in the form of a higher percentage of attorneys’ fees to the extent of individual contributions and couple that with
requirements of independent-director review of settlement fairness and full disclosure
of settlement terms. See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1575-82 (proposing a form of attorneys’ fees that varies based on the settlement source along with SEC-mandated independent-director review of any proposed settlement).
141
See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 635 (“The threat of enterprise liability essentially instructs the firm to take precautions . . . to reduce the systemwide fraud risk.”).
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law enforcement is more likely to be a problem where individuals are
142
the primary enforcement targets.
We note an alternative possibility—substituting public enforcement. If the risk of a chill is serious, then setting fines arguably should
not be a function of assuring an attractive rate of return on investment
in private litigation. Instead, a public body pursuing a policy outcome
should set fines. To the extent that these fines are too low to attract
private enforcers, public enforcement should be the fallback option.
C. Institutional Constraints
Once the overdeterrence problem has improved the appearance
of enterprise liability, the next phase of the argument puts a positive
gloss on private enforcement by comparing the public alternative—in
particular, SEC enforcement. In this story, the choice lies not between private and public enforcement, but between private enforcement and no enforcement at all.
The SEC does have an arsenal of enforcement weapons, including
civil penalties, disgorgement of profits, bars on employment at public
143
companies,
and, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes144
145
Oxley), freezes on extraordinary payments from issuers and a

142

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 643-44 (stating that if private losses
were not compensable, people would have an incentive to take too many precautions);
Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 635 (explaining how “risk-fearing individual executives . . . might . . . be excessively cautious,” and therefore the riskneutral firm should undertake the task of implementing precautionary measures). To
put this a different way, targeting the firm rather than the individuals spreads the risk
from managers to investors, who, given diversification, are better able to bear it. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 640-41.
It has also been argued that enterprise liability has a hidden positive incentive.
Even though it deflects the blame from the culpable, it encourages monitoring by the
outside directors and third-party gatekeepers. These actors are in need of incentives to
engage in stricter monitoring. See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at
636 (discussing how outside directors will not be subject to temptation or cognitive bias and therefore “will insist on rigorous monitoring and internal controls to avoid
large-scale enterprise liability”). By contrast, note that one possible gatekeeper, the
liability insurer, has no place at this incentive table. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 100,
at 1808 (showing, empirically, that D&O insurers invest little in monitoring management
and that their risk assessment and pricing structures send a weak deterrence signal).
143
Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 652-54.
144
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
145
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1103, 15 U.S.C. § 78-u3(c) (2006); see also SEC v. GemstarTV Guide Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that section 1103
“would allow the SEC, during an investigation, to seek an order in Federal court im-
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146

compensation clawback triggered by accounting restatements. But,
historically, the agency has not vigorously deployed these weapons
against individual defendants.
Indeed, SEC enforcement actions bear a more than passing resemblance to FOTM actions—the agency tends to settle with the enterprise funding the penalty rather than with the culpable individu147
als. Actors at the SEC are aware of the problem. Since Enron, the
148
regulators have been targeting more individuals, but the agency
continues to face internal disagreement regarding individuals versus
149
corporate contributions to settlements.

posing a 45-day freeze on extraordinary payments to corporate executives”) (quoting
148 CONG. REC. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott)).
146
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (providing a statutory enforcement mechanism for asset-forfeiture proceedings against noncompliant officers).
The SEC recently initiated the first clawback case in which the targeted executive did
not act culpably. See SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“Section 304 requires a CEO to reimburse an issuer even where the CEO committed no
personal wrongdoing”).
147
See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 654 (explaining that the
SEC’s limited resources restrain the agency from pursuing more contentious enforcement actions against individual executives). Historically, even when individual fines
are imposed, the settlements often permit the operation of indemnification agreements between corporations and managers. Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: “Penalties and Sanctions for Securities
Fraud”: Remarks Before the American Economic Association (Jan. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch010607css.htm. But SEC practice has
changed, and individual defendants now must pay themselves. See infra text accompanying note 361.
148
See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 628 (“Since 2002 especially, the SEC has clearly been more aggressive in seeking remedies against individual executives, and even companies themselves appear more willing to try to recoup payments they have made to dishonest managers.”). The SEC has also taken steps to
articulate its standards for determining when to target the enterprise rather than the
individuals. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. This initiative did not, however, contribute to more vigorous enforcement. See infra notes 264-87 and accompanying text.
149
Those pushing for individual liability have been in the minority. See Kara
Scannell, Clawbacks Divide SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7-8, 2010, at B3 (describing Commissioner Aguilar’s “threat not to vote on cases where he thinks the agency is too lax”).
Meanwhile, a few courts have recently displayed dissatisfaction with lowball SEC enforcement settlements and the agency’s failure to pursue individuals. See Jonathan
Weil, Citigroup’s Sweetheart Deal Flunks Smell Test, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2010, 9:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/citigroup-s-sweetheart-deal-flunks-smelltest-jonathan-weil.html (describing district judge’s demand for a brief from the SEC
regarding the agency’s questionable treatment of Citibank).
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More generally, the agency is described as chronically underfunded and understaffed, and its existing staff is described as subject
150
to high turnover. It is also seen as politically vulnerable. If the SEC
rouses itself and directs its enforcement power against culpable executives, management can use its influence in Congress to reduce the
151
agency’s budget, thereby choking off the initiative. Some see private
enforcement as a way around this problem, with the promise of high
settlement payments assuring a continuous enforcement incentive.
Plaintiffs’ law firms, moreover, are seen to possess superior economies
152
of scale and scope along with a significant financial incentive. This
is, in short, a classic “public versus private” debate in which private incentives trump clumsy, compromised public administration.
D. Empirical Results
A stack of empirical studies confirms that FOTM actions have
some deterrent impact. These studies show that private securities litigation magnifies the negative impact of bad news disclosures by adding costs for both the enterprise and individual managers, implying a
deterrent effect. For example, FOTM defendants are more likely to
replace their CEOs than are companies that suffer financial reversals
153
but no lawsuits. It follows that a CEO interested in holding onto his

150

See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection:
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1139, 1140, 1156
(2003) (“The United States has under-funded the hard work of investor protection,
holding back from the system the resources it would take to substantially lessen the
expectations gap, even if it can never be eliminated.”).
151
See Fox, supra note 92, at 328 (describing the “fear that administrative officials
might fail to prosecute apparently worthwhile individual cases because of pressure
from wealthy or powerful individuals who would be negatively affected”).
152
Id. at 329-30.
153
See, e.g., Greg Niehaus & Greg Roth, Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in Firms Subject to Securities Class Action, 28 FIN. MGMT. 52, 53 (1999) (“[D]efendant
firms experience a higher CEO turnover rate relative to matched firms that also experienced large stock price drops . . . [and] meritorious cases are more likely to result in
CEO turnover.”); Philip Strahan, Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and Managerial Agency Problems 3-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Paper No. 9816, 1998), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9816.pdf (“While
ownership structure and broad composition do not change after securities class actions, the likelihood of CEO turnover nearly doubles, and the increase is statistically
significant.”). Results in this literature, however, are mixed. See Anup Agrawal, et al.,
Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 309, 332 (1999) (finding little systematic evidence that firms suspected of or
charged with fraud have unusually high turnover of senior managers or directors).
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job should avoid involvement with fraud, and that enterprise liability
is not necessarily without individual consequences.
Let us accept the point that FOTM actions have negative consequences. A follow-up question arises: how salient is FOTM’s consequential contribution? The closer one looks, the less salient its profile.
Ex ante, the primary deterrence mechanism for corporate managers is the market—bad things happen to those who perform badly.
CEO turnover is in the first instance associated with poor corporate
154
performance, and poor performance by itself generates antifraud
litigation. As between the two, we suspect the performance incentive
looms larger as a motivator for corporate decisionmakers. Note that
in many cases where an executive is fired following a FOTM complaint, the board is also faced with the discovery of culpable fraud (in
some cases accompanied by insider trading), an occurrence that
should result in termination quite apart from the presence or absence
of private litigation. Culpability and termination go together. When
firms are faced with enforcement action by the SEC or the Department of Justice, the termination statistics are overwhelming: Karpoff,
Lee, and Martin find that 93.4% of managers identified as culpable by
155
government enforcers lose their jobs.
We accordingly look to FOTM for an incremental impact. To get
156
a better handle on this, consider a finding on reputational effects.
By hypothesis, if private lawsuits target badly governed companies, reputational damage to the defendant companies’ independent directors should follow. But Eric Helland’s study, which substitutes numbers of directorships as a measure of reputation, shows no such
effect—to the contrary, numbers of directorships increase for direc157
There is an important caveat:
tors of companies accused of fraud.

154

Cf. Jerold B. Warner et al., Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 461, 487-88 (1988) (investigating the “relation between a firm’s stock price performance and subsequent changes in its top management”); Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 453 (1988) (examining relationship between board composition and frequency of performance-based CEO turnover).
155
Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 201 tbl.3 (2008).
156
See Eric Helland, A Secondary Market Test of the Merits of Class Action Securities Litigation: Evidence from the Reputation of Corporate Directors 18 (Contracting & Orgs. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 2004-05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=517183 (examining the correlation between reputational penalties for directors and shareholder class actions).
157
Id. at 18.

BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Fraud on the Market

11/17/2011 6:02 PM

113

directors of companies in the top quartile of the sample in terms of
158
settlement amount appear to incur reputational damage.
There are two implications. First, private actions do not in themselves signal governance defalcation to the markets. Second, big settlement numbers do signal governance defalcation. It seems, once
again, that performance matters most, with litigation positioned in a
secondary, follow-up role so far as negative consequences and the associated deterrent effect are concerned.
Finally, consider a finding on stock prices. Professors Ferris and
Pritchard took a sample of defendant firms and found an average
negative stock price reaction of approximately 25% on the corrective
159
disclosure date.
The prospect of FOTM litigation is one factor in
the negative mix. Realization of that prospect in the form of a complaint being filed causes a further average stock price reduction of
160
3.33%. And so we have another FOTM consequence, but not necessarily one that adds to the case for its defense. These figures show
how enterprise liability worsens a bad corporate situation and injures
innocent parties, even as it fails to focus on the responsible actors.
FOTM actions also have positive effects. There is evidence that
defendant companies are more poorly governed—accounting fraud is
161
associated with fewer outside directors, and better governance is as162
sociated with more informative disclosure practices.
Litigation, in
turn, is associated with governance improvement. CEO turnover can

158

Id. at 4. Evidence is mixed with respect to directors of companies subject to
SEC enforcement actions. See id. at 21-22 (showing a strong negative impact with respect to the largest companies).
159
Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class
Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 3 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 01-009, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=288216.
160
Id. at 7.
161
See generally Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board
of Directors Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 445 (1996)
(“[N]o-fraud firms have significantly . . . higher percentages of outside directors than
fraud firms.”); Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT.
RES. 1, 21 (1996) (investigating the motives and consequences of earnings manipulation in a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions).
162
See Saumya Mohan, Disclosure Quality and Its Effect on Litigation Risk 11 (Sept.
1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=956499
(“[I]ndependent banks . . . are associated with more informative disclosure levels.”).
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herald improved management at a defendant company. Defendant
163
companies also tend to increase numbers of independent directors.
But an endogeneity question arises: why might a defendant company add independent directors? Litigation might have prompted it
to see the benefits of following the good-governance playbook. Alternatively, litigation itself might make it more convenient to bring in
new outsiders lacking ties to the events in question who can take the
164
lead in approving a settlement.
Consider another positive finding: a company subject to securities
litigation is highly unlikely to be subject to further securities litigation
165
for the three years following the suit.
Learning is implied—the
company now takes compliance more seriously. But other inferences
can also be drawn. Perhaps securities fraud tends to be one-off because the market learns from the experience. Companies that analysts follow will find it difficult to sustain optimism in the face of disappointments, and a single misstatement followed by a correction will
alert the analysts to scrutinize future claims of success closely.
Finally, if companies and executives do learn from their experiences with FOTM, what exactly is the lesson? Companies subject to
shareholder litigation reduce the amount of information they reveal
166
to the markets, particularly about future-earnings expectations.
Managers, it seems, learn that plaintiffs’ lawyers can base accusations
167
It folof misconduct on management’s own voluntary disclosures.
lows that it is better to say less to avoid another lawsuit. More generally, the higher the firms’ litigation-risk profile, the lower the level of vo168
luntary disclosure.
163

See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 143, 161 (2007) (finding that with derivative lawsuits “the proportion of outside representation on the board of directors increases”).
164
Cf. Helland, supra note 156, at 3-4 (pointing out that increased board diversity
in the face of litigation is not always demonstrative of better corporate governance because independent directors may be brought on simply to inoculate the board from
allegations of poor governance at trial).
165
Kim & Skinner, supra note 59, at 23-24.
166
Jonathan L. Rogers & Andrew Van Buskirk, Shareholder Litigation and Changes in
Disclosure Behavior, 47 J. ACCT. & ECON. 136, 154 (2009).
167
Id.
168
See Stephen P. Baginski et al., The Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts Issued in U.S. and Canadian Markets, 77
ACCT. REV. 25, 48 (2002) (arguing that lower legal liability leads to more consistent
voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts and noting this finding’s consistency with earlier studies). See generally Carol A. Frost & Grace Pownall, Accounting
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E. Evaluation
The case for FOTM, thus stated, is more than a little contradictory. It holds that FOTM’s effectiveness stems not from its own deterrent power, but rather from the SEC’s lack thereof. Further, FOTM is
considered a success because an enforcement regime that actually had
deterrent power would have the perverse effect of chilling risk tak169
Empirical studies confirm this view. Thus, FOTM is desirable
ing.
because a serious deterrent regime is unlikely and undesirable. This
is an odd argument for a case that begins with the proposition that
fraud is underdeterred.
If fraud is underdeterred, FOTM does little to solve the problem.
So little, it seems, that the system has begun to evolve around FOTM.
Consider three developments during the decade since Enron. First,
public antifraud enforcement has become a growth industry. Criminal enforcement of the securities laws, once rare, is now institutionalized in specialized corporate fraud task forces organized by the Jus170
tice Department.
The Bush Administration’s team reported that it
obtained almost 1300 convictions (including those of 200 CEOs) and

Disclosure Practices in the United States and the United Kingdom, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 75, 76
(1994) (comparing statement disclosure rates). For a game theory model confirming
the result of distorted incentives, see Joshua Ronen & Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari, Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure, 5 J. FIN. MARKETS 349, 373 (2002).
There is a related question: when there is bad news, should it be disclosed immediately, and, if so, does that preempt litigation? There is a large and somewhat contradictory body of work addressing the timeliness of negative disclosures. See Laura Field
et al., Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation?, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 487, 506 (2005)
(finding that firms with higher litigation risks are more likely to disclose earnings
warnings and that disclosure deters rather than triggers litigation); Douglas J. Skinner,
Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News?, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 38, 57 (1994) (arguing that
managers have incentives to disclose negative earnings statements as a way to preempt
bad quarterly earnings news due to litigation risk and to maintain goodwill within the
investment community); see also Dain C. Donelson et al., The Timeliness of Earnings News
and Litigation Risk 11-12 (McCombs Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. IROM08-10, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641342 (showing an association
between timely disclosure and litigation reduction).
169
See infra note 175.
170
Anton R. Valukas et al., Enforcement Actions in the Post-Enron World: Zero Tolerance
in the White-Collar Arena, 37 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 133, 141 (2004), available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s18News/RelatedDocuments147/1246/Valukas_Sta
uffer_Travis.pdf.
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levied hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and restitution between
171
2002 and 2008.
Second, corporations themselves have been deputized as antifraud
enforcers. Mandatory internal-compliance systems were added to the
enforcement regime, imposed first by the Foreign Corrupt Practices
172
Act of 1977 (FCPA) and then more emphatically by the Sarbanes
173
These statutes take federal antifraud enforceOxley Act of 2002.
ment deep inside corporations, mandating reports and management
174
systems that assure companies’ legal compliance.
These internal
compliance systems require planning and design, staffing and execu175
tion, and monitoring and auditing.
Third, corporate employees (and others) are being rewarded for
giving tips to the SEC about potential violations. Section 922 of the
Dodd-Frank Act charges the SEC with developing a new whistleblower
program to enhance the agency’s capacity to detect fraud in ad176
177
vance. The program, which is up and running, holds out substan178
tial financial compensation for high quality tips.

171

PRESIDENT’S CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT TO
PRESIDENT, at iii-iv (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/
corporate-fraud2008.pdf.
172
Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
173
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
174
See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006) (requiring internal
compliance systems and an annual audit by outside auditors).
175
These systems are thought to be costly. See Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 959-60 (2006) (describing some of the costs of internal compliance systems, ranging from audit fees to less tangible costs, such as less employee
risk taking); Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX
404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 734 (2007) (attributing a decrease in small companies’
IPOs at least in part to the high costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance).
176
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act), § 21D(a)(3), (b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(3), (b)(1) (West 2011) (directing the SEC to reward original information leading to a successful enforcement action with an amount between ten and thirty percent of the sanctions exacted).
177
An Office of the Whistleblower has been established. Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34363 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see also Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
178
Participants in compliance programs are not eligible. See 17 C.F.R. 240.21F4(b)(4)(iii)(B) (2011) (excluding employees responsible for compliance and audits).
But eligible employees are encouraged to work with the compliance office. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(3), (b)(3) (2011) (requiring the SEC to take into account coopTHE
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These developments occurred at the extremes—at one end we see
high-intensity deterrence through criminalization and, at the other,
enforced and rewarded cooperation outside of the litigation system.
One wonders whether a long-term reduction in the incidence of securities fraud will result, but it is too early to tell. Scholars have written
179
about the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley’s new regime, but we are aware of
no significant scholarship on the benefits of increased compliance. Interestingly, however, accounting restatements, the bedrock evidence for
FOTM actions during most of the past decade, started to decline in
2007. In 2006, a total of 1564 companies filed restatements whereas in
180
2009 the number was down to 630. Maybe something is working.
Fraud deterrence is thought to reduce social costs because it protects the securities markets. These markets—and, in particular, their
liquidity—depend on a core of confidence that companies fairly disclose basic information about themselves. Today’s markets are more
liquid than ever, despite the ups, downs, and scandals of the last dec181
ade.
So, even if we still must say that fraud is underdeterred, an
adequate confidence level appears to have been maintained. Meanwhile, our legal system for the most part (the exception being the recent stepped-up threat of criminal liability) avoids imposing penalties
on individual miscreants. What, then, makes the system work?
We return to basic market assumptions: the reputation market
and private governance both punish financial failure, whether or not
accompanied by fraud, and can be expected to punish more severely
when thus accompanied. In addition, as financial markets are quick
to learn, misrepresentations are costly even without enforcement penalties. Optimistic reporting or hiding bad news in the hopes of rescue in better times is a risky strategy in an efficient market. While a
company can control its own information flow, it cannot control news
coverage of market trends or information from competitors who correctly inform the market.

eration or interference with the operation of the compliance system in determining
the amount of the award).
179
See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 175, at 734 (noting Sarbanes-Oxley’s negative effect on small-company IPOs).
180
MARK CHEFFERS ET AL., AUDIT ANALYTICS, 2009 FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: A
NINE YEAR COMPARISON 1 (2010).
181
See James Angel et al., Equity Trading in the 21st Century 7-26 (Univ. of S. Cal.
Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. FBE 09-10, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1584026 (identifying a variety of metrics for analyzing recent volatility in equity trading).
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None of this makes legal enforcement irrelevant. But between
criminal enforcement initiatives, internal compliance regimes, liberal
rewards to whistleblowers, and market controls, we emerge skeptical
about the backstop case for FOTM. If, despite all of the above, fraud
remains underdeterred, then perhaps it is time to seek more potent
enforcement alternatives. The specter of overdeterrence rises in response. We offer two rejoinders. First, despite the continued refrain
of underdeterence, increased criminal prosecution in the post-Enron
era already creates an overdeterrence risk. Second, civil enforcement
only implies this risk if left to private plaintiffs. Fines must increase to
entice the plaintiffs’ lawyers to court, but public enforcement creates
no such risk.
In sum, FOTM’s deterrent value is so uncertain and the individual
enforcement alternatives so clearly superior that “deterrence” cannot
be an adequate standalone justification. Reviewing the deterrence
case does not close the book in FOTM’s favor, but rather keeps it
open for further inquiry. If the best that can be said about FOTM is
“it still doesn’t make any sense, but it’s all we have,” then something
has gone very wrong.
We undertake the inquiry into what went wrong in Part IV.
There, we account for FOTM’s politically protected status, noting in
particular shareholder interest’s rise to political salience. Having thus
diagnosed the political pathology that gives FOTM its aura of inevitability, we make a reform suggestion in Part V. Using shareholder protection for policy grounding, we show that the SEC’s civil enforcement
arm is a more formidable operation than it once was and make a case
for stepped-up SEC enforcement capability as a cost-effective substitute for FOTM. But before we embark on those discussions, we must
evaluate one final line of justification for FOTM. FOTM advocates
have repackaged their causes of action as a means of improving corporate governance. Part III considers this claim.
III. FRAUD ON THE MARKET AS GOVERNANCE
FOTM proponents, presumably reeling in the wake of the compensation critique and apparently not content to rest their case on deterrence, pursue a new path to justification. They claim that FOTM
makes a positive governance contribution. This Part evaluates that
position, which rests on the idea that the governance system works
well only if shareholders have the information needed to evaluate
management. While this is a fair point, it seems more to underscore
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the importance of the mandatory-disclosure system than to support
FOTM. Indeed, the more closely we look at FOTM as a mechanism
within the governance system, the more anomalous and dysfunctional
it looks. FOTM does not result in direct accountability for managerial
failure; its consequences do not follow from the judgment of the
shareholders as a group; and it causes stock prices to go down. Other
corporate-governance institutions admit of significant contractual inputs and hew to productivity concerns as they evolve over time. Federal judges applying self-referential case law and members of Congress
responding to interest groups shaped FOTM several stages removed
from the productivity margin.
Section A points out substantive implications of the shift in conceptual framework from compensation and deterrence to corporate
governance. Section B lays out the governance case for FOTM and
points out its shortcomings. Section C shifts course and draws on a
comparison to state fiduciary law to make a governance case against
FOTM. Section D summarizes.
A. The Governance Framework
The governance defense of FOTM has roots in Professor Romano’s early empirical study of shareholder litigation. She found, as
have subsequent studies, that shareholder litigation tends to affect
weakly governed companies and concluded that litigation complements shareholder monitoring to align the interests of managers and
182
shareholders.
But she also concluded that shareholder litigation is
183
Subsequent writers reversed her conclusion,
mostly ineffective.
pointing to better governance not just as an incidental consequence
184
of shareholder litigation, but as a self-standing justification for it.

182

Romano, supra note 102, at 85 (finding that firms who are sued are more likely
to have weak governance structures and noting that shareholder litigation has consequences that help to align the interests of shareholders and managers).
183
Id. at 84-85 (“The data support the conclusion that shareholder litigation is a
weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance.”). Note that this beginning point establishes a functional connection without reference to federal securities
case law. There one encounters Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, in which the Supreme
Court ruled that fraud within the meaning of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act does not
include unfair transactions that violate state fiduciary duties. 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977),
184
See Fox, supra note 92, at 325-30 (defending the present system on a governance theory while also proposing a substitute litigation framework directed at individual actors); Pritchard, supra note 131, at 937 (describing governance enhancement
as central to the purpose of some antifraud litigation).
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The transition from deterrence to governance necessarily brings a
shift of perspective. Where deterrence seeks accurate market prices to
promote liquidity, governance redirects the view to the individual
corporate issuer and seeks transparency as a means to achieve agency185
cost reduction. More particularly, transparency leads to better business planning and execution because shareholder inputs are meaningful only if business-policy issues can be accurately appraised from
the outside. The shift from market accuracy to agency-cost reduction
also means a shift from one body of law and economics to another—
from the economics of sanctions and public law to agency-cost economics and private law. Finally, we shift from seeking social-cost reduction
and social-welfare maximization to maximizing individual firm value.
Despite these shifts, the governance and deterrence frameworks
converge at the bottom line. We are still talking about deterring fraud,
even as the end in view shifts to better governance. Transparency, the
governance objective, presupposes accurate market prices, which in
turn are the objective of the deterrence justification. At the same time,
accurately priced markets tend to be liquid markets, and these two factors together lower the cost of capital for securities issuers. The public
goal of protecting the markets thus, in the end, seeks the same corporate-value maximization as the private-governance framework.
There is no such convergence between “FOTM as governance”
and “FOTM as compensation,” even though the theories share some
conceptual affinities. Shifting from deterrence to governance returns
us to the private side of the public-private divide. This is the same side
Implications from a line of empirical analysis may have added traction to the governance analysis. These are multicountry studies that compare public enforcement,
measured in terms of government agencies’ legal empowerment, against private enforcement, measured in terms of disclosure mandates and private liability standards.
The private factors are associated with deep trading markets, dispersed ownership and
numbers of initial public offerings (IPOs). See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 23, 25 (2006) (examining the nexus between IPOs and securities-fraud liability). Any traction has dissipated in the wake of Jackson and Roe’s
paper, supra note 1, at 207, which substitutes and compares the results of a test based
on resource allocations to public enforcers. Unsurprisingly, the association between
market robustnesss and public-enforcement resources is stronger than that based on
the private factors. See id. (noting that public-enforcement resources are as closely associated with strong capital markets as is private disclosure and are more associated
with strong markets than are other markers of private enforcement).
185
See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1995) (discussing how mandatory disclosure has its origins in
common law devices for agency-cost reduction). The SEC went on to transform mandatory disclosure to enhance accuracy in the markets such that the system now pursues
both objectives. Id. at 1048-50.
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as the compensation justification, which also emphasizes the shareholder interest. But the presuppositions that motivate FOTM as compensation are otherwise discarded. The compensation theory’s goal is
to get money into the pockets of particular shareholders, but a debilitating internal inconsistency results when FOTM allows other shareholders to fund the payments. The shift to governance largely solves
186
Shareholders are expected to pay for corporate gothis problem.
vernance because it reduces agency costs and makes them better off.
Of course, FOTM does not spread its costs evenly. But where the distributional imbalance inherent in pocket shifting is an adverse result
within the compensation framework, it is irrelevant within the governance framework so long as FOTM’s beneficial effects imply net positives across the board.
B. The Governance Case for FOTM
What benefits does FOTM bring to the corporate governance system? The literature puts forward a two-part answer: (1) FOTM forces
transparency and facilitates monitoring to foster good governance,
and (2) FOTM helps shareholders surmount the legal and collectiveaction barriers to fulfill their role as principals in an agency relationship with managers. We consider each claim in turn.
1. FOTM and Transparency
Proponents of FOTM as governance point out that the governance system—and in particular the shareholders’ roles therein—
187
depends on transparency to function properly. They then rest their
case, implicitly relying on a crucial assumption—that FOTM is neces188
sary to achieve transparency.
This assumption in turn follows from
the deterrence case, namely that FOTM enhances transparency by deterring fraud. Thus does the governance case collapse back into the
deterrence case, shifting the emphasis without adding anything.
In order to strengthen the case for FOTM, the governance justification requires additional support. Because the justificatory claim

186

See Fox, supra note 92, at 327 (describing the cost of shareholder litigation as a
“user fee” for investors).
187
Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 253-57.
188
See id. at 273 (noting that foreign governments concerned with transparency
have increasingly adopted civil liability for corporate noncompliance).
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concerns transparency, then, by hypothesis, FOTM actions must add
something to the information available about the target company.
We are hard pressed to detect a positive informational contribution. FOTM actions are backward looking. Attorneys construct them
by connecting a corporate announcement that causes a decline in the
stock price with a material anterior disclosure that has since been
deemed inaccurate. The lawsuit’s chance of success depends largely
on the strength of the connection and the financial impact of the
connected events, which is established by a statistical analysis of past
stock prices. Any prospective informational input comes from the
signal the lawsuit sends about management quality.
But how much information does a FOTM suit add? The bad business news is already on the table, as is the anterior disclosure. Depending on the facts, the action may or may not highlight that the anterior disclosure amounted to a misstatement. Often, as with accounting restatements, the existence of a prior misstatement will be
part and parcel of the bad news. In cases with a parallel SEC proceeding, the private action may have no informational role to play at all.
Finally, although some cases will highlight or add facts, cases without
merit will also generate noise on the screen.
As noted, any information developed in connection with a FOTM
action will relate primarily to management quality, and this information will presumably bear negatively on individual managers’ reputations. But we have seen that it is not safe to assume that FOTM actions have negative reputational consequences for all implicated
managers, but rather follow only for outside directors of the compa189
Given a significant loss, we wonder
nies with the biggest losses.
whether the negative message would register in the marketplace with
or without a FOTM action.
Overall we see little in the way of a supplemental informational contribution. This thin benefit must be weighed against the informational
cost. We have seen that companies experiencing a FOTM action seek
to avoid future confrontations by decreasing their discretionary disclo190
sures. Overall, then, we see no positive contribution to transparency.
This is not a surprise. When problems arise concerning the quantum and quality of information flowing to the markets, attention turns
to the mandatory-disclosure system. When an adjustment seems necessary, rulemaking processes go forward at the SEC and the Financial
189
190

See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
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191

Accounting Standards Board. These processes include inputs of information and expertise from interested parties. Now compare
FOTM as a source of disclosure mandates. It yields case law on particular questions of truth, falsity, and materiality. That case law results
from encounters between litigating attorneys (plaintiffs’, defendants’,
the SEC’s, and amici’s) and courts whose judges, for the most part,
192
are composed of former government attorneys. While such encounters certainly may benefit from considered policy analysis, the decisionmakers have no duty to consider or seek out such inputs. Nor do
they necessarily possess expertise respecting either the policy or the
mechanics of future application by reporting companies.
It is fortunate, then, that FOTM plays only a minor role in generating the terms of the mandatory-disclosure system.
2. FOTM and the Shareholder-Manager Agency Relationship
Professors Thompson and Sale describe a governance role for
193
FOTM independent of its role as a mandatory-disclosure backstop.
They suggest that federal securities litigation occupies governance ter194
ritory that overlaps with the state law duty of care. They look to specific provisions of the mandatory-disclosure system to establish the
overlap and show how its directives probe deeply into corporate deci195
sionmaking and risk-management processes. They then extend the
overlap to shareholder antifraud litigation, making a series of characterizations, all of which are fair: (1) a shareholder action prompted
by an accounting restatement involving earnings is an action based on
a loss in corporate value stemming from mismanagement, and thus
196
such an action is a proxy for a state law duty of care action; (2) a
federal antifraud shareholder action, like a state law care action, ad-

191

William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 13-15, 22-24 (2007).
192
See RUSSELL WHEELER, BROOKINGS INST., THE CHANGING FACE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6-8 (2009) (noting a trend toward appointing lawyers from the public
sector as judges).
193
Thompson & Sale, supra note 60, at 872.
194
See id. at 872-73 (“The [SEC] regulations are extensive and provide for disclosures arguably designed to enforce what are basic state law fiduciary duties.”).
195
See id. at 873-75 (explaining how, for example, one such regulation describes in
detail what should be included in a company’s financial report).
196
See id. at 887.
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197

dresses the officers’ conduct of the business; and (3) a federal
shareholder action implies that the officers’ stewardship of the com198
pany is not what the shareholders would want it to be.
The overlap, thus established, is descriptive and does not advance a
justification for FOTM. But Thompson and Sale go further, asserting
that federal litigation enhances opportunities for shareholders to per199
form a direct “governance role” and hold officers accountable, in effect letting the shareholders assume the board of directors’s monitoring
200
role.
These stronger claims, if sustainable, carry normative traction.
We think Thompson and Sale carry their point a step too far when
they suggest that FOTM litigation lets shareholders realize untapped
potential as agency principals who may bypass the board of directors
and directly hold managers accountable. A FOTM complaint by definition names at least one corporate director or officer. But FOTM in
practice almost never holds anyone to an individual admission of liability, much less individual accountability, because doing so decreases
201
the action’s economic value to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Any real accountability, such as a CEO firing, is an incidental effect. Whether the
termination follows from the business failure itself, the board’s reaction to the executive’s defalcation, the violation of the securities laws
taken alone, or the violation taken together with the FOTM action,
will depend on the case. Our sense is that when boards remove CEOs,
business failures loom larger than compliance defalcations.
Suppose for a moment that FOTM actually works as Thompson
and Sale describe and does provide a direct channel for shareholder
participation in business decisions. We doubt that it would be tolerated for long in that role. Under FOTM, it is not the shareholders
acting as a group who make decisions, as occurs when they exercise
the franchise, but a plaintiffs’ lawyer subject to oversight by a named
202
plaintiff (or group of named plaintiffs) and a federal judge. This,
197

See id. at 897 (“The federal cases focus on the failure of managers, principally
officers, to fulfill their management obligations.”).
198
See id. at 907 (asserting that shareholders institute a securities action “by complaining about the difference in the price at which they bought . . . and the lower, actual value of the stock with which they are stuck”).
199
Id. at 871.
200
See id. at 888 (stating that in state-law fiduciary suits, shareholders often respond
to managers’ decisions by “suing to limit the directors’ freedom to act or not to act”).
201
See supra notes 121-31.
202
For a discussion of governance questions arising within the class action context,
see Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 337, 340. See also Richard Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State:
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quite simply, is not an appropriate context for business decisionmaking, including decisions on CEO tenure. There is a lack of accountability. When shareholder litigation is meritless or otherwise has perverse effects on the defendant corporation’s business, neither the
named plaintiff, nor its attorneys, nor the judge need take responsibility. Further, the informational environment is not conducive to business decisionmaking. Litigators and judges have forensic expertise
and focus on the past. Value, in contrast, concerns the future.
Finally, FOTM actions can result in new internal governance regulations. Settling defendants often implement governance improvements, but these nonpecuniary settlement items can be distinguished
203
These items operate prospecfrom the effects of the lawsuit itself.
tively and presumably have the approval of a board of directors that is
itself forward looking. Even if named plaintiffs, their lawyers, and
federal judges are not the ideal actors to generate corporate legislation, and even if a settlement table trading governance improvements
for damages and attorneys’ fees is far from an ideal negotiating environment, positive contributions can nonetheless be made.
For us, the question presented concerns the place that nonpecuniary settlement terms take in the overall cost-benefit balance. We
suspect they carried greater weight thirty years ago when goodgovernance practices were only setting out on the long road to institutionalization. It is different today. Best practices are the subject of
ongoing engagement between managers, directors, market intermediaries, institutional shareholders, and regulators. The curve of self204
regulatory responsiveness has been sloping upward. There certainly
is room for governance improvement incident to litigation shocks at
poorly governed firms. But an institution as costly as FOTM cannot

Kalven and Rosenfeld Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 604 (2008) (discussing the challenges of class action settlement in the regulatory state). The PSLRA supposes that size
of shareholding should be the lead factor in determining the selection of an appropriate lead plaintiff. See PSLRA § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) (“[T]he
court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action
arising under this chapter is the person or group of persons that . . . has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.”); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1155 (2011) (challenging the supposition on legitimacy grounds and advocating formation of broadly based groups of
named plaintiffs).
203
See Ferris et al., supra note 163, at 163 (discussing corporate governance improvements in the wake of litigation and settlement).
204
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 675-88 (challenging the notion that
shareholder empowerment will result in the reduction of agency costs).
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possibly make sense as a generalized mechanism for the dispersion of
best practices.
C. The Governance Case Against FOTM
We noted above that nobody goes to court to procure disclosure
rules that enhance transparency and hence improve governance. But
the corporate governance system does remit shareholders to court to
enforce management fiduciary duties. It follows that the state law fiduciary enforcement apparatus, which also involves going to court,
provides a reference point from which to appraise FOTM’s role in
corporate governance.
State fiduciary law and the federal securities laws have numerous interconnections. For example, history’s first disclosure mandates were
targeted at conflict-of-interest transactions and were promulgated to fa205
Today, section 10(b)’s
cilitate private enforcement of fiduciary law.
insider trading cases create a zone of prohibited self-dealing where state
206
law hesitated to intervene. But insider trading is a zone of individual
rather than enterprise liability, so it does not implicate FOTM’s policy
problems. The fiduciary territory closest to FOTM is the state law duty
207
We differ from
of care, as Thompson and Sale correctly point out.
them, however, with respect to the comparison’s policy implications.
The state law duty of care could easily be a venue for big-ticket litigation, just like FOTM. For that to be the case, business judgments
gone wrong would need to be actionable on a res ipsa loquitor basis, with
damages set as the economic loss to the corporation from the carelessly undertaken action. Accountability would follow—state fiduciary duties are enforceable through derivative actions and so directly target
board members. Thus hypothesized, the state law duty of care would
be considerably more threatening to business people than is FOTM.
But, of course, the duty of care is anything but threatening because state law has sought to ensure that business judgments gone

205

See Mahoney, supra note 185, at 1089 (arguing that “the alleviation of agency
problems . . . [was] identified as an indirect benefit of the ‘full disclosure’ philosophy”).
206
See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1321-30 (1999) (describing the Supreme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence in fiduciary terms); cf. Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (cutting off access to section 10(b) as an avenue
for direct enforcement of the state law duty of loyalty).
207
See supra notes 194-08 and accompanying text.
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208

wrong do not become actionable as a function of hindsight. So narrow is the duty of care’s formulation that it was once fashionable to
209
But that
propose its abolition on the ground of sheer irrelevance.
was before the Delaware Supreme Court departed from tradition in
Smith v. Van Gorkom to use the duty’s traditional formulation to hold a
210
board of directors liable for a hastily approved merger. Van Gorkom,
by signaling that the duty of care could be plaintiff-friendly, led to its
de facto abolition. The Delaware legislature responded to dissatisfaction with the decision by adding section 102(b)(7) to Delaware’s corporate code, permitting corporations to opt out of the duty of care in
211
their charters (but not the duties of loyalty and good faith). By now,
212
most large corporations have done so.
The comparison to FOTM is telling. Where federal courts parroting the phrase “investor protection” expand liability without much
concern for the impact on business decisionmaking and operations,
state courts do concern themselves with business operations and
shape fiduciary law accordingly. Their scrupulousness follows from
charter competition: any state that fails to be scrupulous loses its large
213
incorporations, with Delaware being the only state with large stakes
in the game. An element of contractual consent thereby enters into
214
the relationship of the regulator and the regulated, an element

208

See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that “liability is
rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment”).
209
See Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1983) (“[V]ery little of any value would be
lost by outright abolition of the legal duty of care and its accompanying threat of a lawsuit.”); Elliott J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984) (arguing against the duty of care on the
grounds that individual directors are assumed to give considerable thought to each
business decision, thus rendering them invulnerable to suit).
210
See 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (holding that “[i]n carrying out their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation
and its shareholders” and that the board of directors had failed to uphold such duty).
211
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010).
212
See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 692 (2009) (“After section 102(b)(7) was enacted, the shareholders of almost all Delaware corporations approved charter amendments containing
these exculpatory provisions . . . .”).
213
See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 626-31 (2006) (outlining New Jersey’s fall from being the jurisdiction of choice for American corporations).
214
See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 130 (1993)
(“[T]he powerful dynamic of state competition ensures that provisions perceived to
increase share value are enacted over time.”).
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largely absent in the federal securities context. With the 102(b)(7)
opt-out, explicit consent enters the state law picture, and corporations—with their shareholders’ approval—have decided that the benefits of care-based litigation are not worth the costs.
The state law comparison thus raises the question of opting out of
FOTM. The issue follows inevitably from the invocation of corporate
governance as an evaluative framework. Governance, as we noted
above, moves the discussion to the private side of the public-private
divide to focus on agency-cost reduction. Agency-cost reduction, in
turn, is predominantly a contractual exercise. In their classic work,
Professors Jensen and Meckling depicted agency-cost reduction as a
dynamic contracting process in which both managers and shareholders address agency costs over time, in the managers’ case by bonding
their fidelity, and in the shareholders’ case by monitoring their in215
vestments. If agency costs remain unaddressed, it is because it is too
costly for the parties to remove themselves. The result that follows for
corporate governance is that, as new agency costs appear, the system
will find ways to reduce them, even as residual agency costs will persist
216
in the wake of the system’s adjustments. If the actors in the governance system do not find FOTM costs beneficial, then they should be
free to contract around FOTM, just as they contract around the duty
of care and into lower agency costs.
The objection to this line of reasoning is that fraud is different.
The agency model depicts endogenous contractual adjustments within
a system to which fraud is exogenous. In the model, agency-cost reduction follows from management bonding and shareholder monitor217
ing. When managers do not tell the truth, it disables the shareholders’ monitoring function (even as nothing prevents a manager from
bonding himself to tell the truth). Thus, agency-cost reduction presupposes disclosure mandates and fraud enforcers.
Assume that this argument is correct, and that fraud is exogenous
to the agency model and requires mandatory suppression. It does
not necessarily follow that FOTM also must be mandatory, for with-

215

Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-30 (1976).
216
We have argued elsewhere that the corporate governance system has indeed
evolved dynamically over the past several decades to reduce agency costs substantially,
making a series of endogenous adjustments to agency-cost control both in boardrooms
and in financial markets. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 675-88.
217
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 215, at 308-09.
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out it, we would still have an extensive public apparatus to enforce
disclosure mandates.
Let us then go forward to a thought experiment in opting out.
Suppose Congress enacted a statute (or the SEC promulgated a rule)
that put FOTM up for a yea-or-nay vote at every publicly traded com218
pany.
A nay would mean that in any future section 10(b) action
respecting a disclosure or failure to disclose by a nontrading company
or company actor, the plaintiff would be required to show actual reliance. Because FOTM is a creature of federal law, a federal law presumably could give effect to a shareholder opt-out resolution without
ancillary complications concerning placement in corporate charters
219
or bylaws.
We would structure this company-by-company plebiscite to precipitate maximum focus within the shareholder community on the costbenefit question presented. We would thus delay a vote until the
second proxy season after enactment to allow institutional investors
adequate time to formulate their policy views. To minimize the risk of
perverse effects, no company would be locked into the result
220
reached. Prospectively, all companies would be free to opt in or out
of FOTM in the future, with shared agenda control—either a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 or a management proposal would
put the issue to the shareholders.
It is hard to see what objections could be raised against this arrangement, given the assumption that FOTM is a corporategovernance device on the private side of the public-private divide.
The best objection we can conceive is the one we have raised else-

218

We are not the first to discuss opting out in connection with FOTM. Pritchard
argued that shareholders should make a partial waiver of the FOTM reliance presumption to deprive wrongdoers of any benefit under Rule 10b-5. See Pritchard, supra note
138, at 247-55. However, our thought experiment puts the matter in a framework that
advances the policy discussion.
Meanwhile, Professor Pritchard has put forward opting out of FOTM as a shareholder proposal proponent at Alaska Air. Alaska Air sought permission to exclude the
proposal, and the SEC staff responded with a no-action letter. See Alaska Air Group,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 916161, at *2 (Mar. 11, 2011) (stating that the
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance would not recommend enforcement against
Alaska Air for omitting the proposal from its proxy materials).
219
A shareholder resolution that the board of directors did not first approve would
not conform to Delaware’s requirements for a charter amendment. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit.8, § 242 (Supp. 2010). It could, if necessary, be characterized as a shareholder bylaw.
220
Cf. Fox, supra note 92, at 316 (noting that a contractual disclosure regime established at the time of an IPO could not guarantee credible disclosure for the life of
a firm).
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where against shareholder empowerment with respect to business policymaking—that the shareholders, due to information asymmetries,
221
are incapable of competently exercising the franchise. But we think
the cases are distinguishable. A shareholder power to opt into control
over business policy would have immediate negative consequences.
The very threat of intervention would cause management to cater to
the stock’s market price in formulating and executing the business
222
plan. Perverse effects could follow. With FOTM, any connection to
business policymaking is indirect, and information asymmetries
present less of a problem. It is true that shareholders at a particular
company could vote against FOTM, only to discover later that fraud
had been brewing even as they took a fraud-enforcement device off
the table. But we would expect them to anticipate that possibility
when voting. To the extent they deem FOTM to have robust compensatory, deterrent, or governance properties, they should vote yea. If
not, they should vote nay, whether or not a fraud was brewing.
Mandating an across-the-board vote at every company could be
controversial. The section 102(b)(7) precedent, by vesting the opt
out in the corporate charter, puts the decision in management’s
hands, subject to a ratifying shareholder vote. It can be argued that
the same should be done here. If a given management is happy to
remain subject to FOTM actions, why should we disturb the status
quo? There are three answers.
First, an economy-wide referendum only becomes possible once
we shift from the state to the federal context. Any state law precedent
is indirect. Second, because the policy questions surrounding FOTM
concern the trading market and implicate shareholder interests across
the board, it follows that solicitation of an across-the-board response is
an appropriate reaction to the problem. Third, an across-the-board
approach keeps the informational screen as clear of noise as possible.
Leaving the motion to management muddies the water with questions
about positive or negative signals of the particular managers’ fidelity
221

See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73 , at 696-705 (discussing the importance of
managers due to the information asymmetries of shareholders). For a strange twist on
FOTM and shareholder empowerment, see COMM. ON CAP. MARKETS REG., INTERIM
REPORT 16 (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_
Interim_ReportREV2.pdf, which suggests that greater shareholder empowerment
means stronger market discipline and diminished reliance on litigation as a governance supplement.
222
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 698-703 (arguing that information
asymmetries may negatively affect IPO pricing, financing choices, and corporate investment policy).
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223

to the mandatory-disclosure regime. Alternatively, a given management might hesitate to present the question for fear that a negative
shareholder response might destabilize its position. In this regard,
note that the grounds for contractual modification of FOTM already
may exist. The strongest such case applies to contractually mandated
arbitration, which has been validated elsewhere under the 1934 Act by
224
Alternatively, companies may have the power
the Supreme Court.
225
Yet we are
to waive their shareholders’ right to bring class actions.
not aware, under either alternative, of any management generated
opt-out experiments indicating hesitation on management’s part.
We see no ancillary process or informational problems. If the
shareholder community, on reflection, concludes that FOTM is beneficial, it can be expected to vote yea, just as it does year after year on
226
the nay side with respect to the vast majority of shareholder proposals.
A question arises: might the shareholders vote nay, expecting public
enforcers to pick up any resulting slack and thereby externalizing the

223

See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77
VA. L. REV. 945, 954-56 (1991) (providing a default rule analysis of mandatory disclosure and FOTM, highlighting the range of possible corporate preferences).
224
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86
(1989) (holding claims under the 1933 Act to be arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (holding 1934 Act claims to be arbitrable
and not barred by section 29’s invalidation of waivers of compliance); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special
Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 954 (1988) (suggesting that some 10b-5 actions
could be precluded by an agreement to arbitrate set out in the charter). An SEC rule
barring arbitration of class action claims stands in the way, however. Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration
Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, 52,660 (Nov. 4, 1992). For an extended discussion,
see Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform
of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 635 (2010).
225
See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 424 (2005) (exploring possibilities for preclusion of class actions through collective-action waivers). Professor Pritchard extends
the point, suggesting that companies include a partial waiver of the FOTM reliance
presumption in their charters. See Pritchard, supra note 138, at 248-51 (suggesting
changes to the damages provision). Under this theory, reliance on FOTM would limit
recoverable damages to profit disgorgement; a party establishing actual reliance could
request out-of-pocket losses. Id. Pritchard acknowledges that a bar to waivers of compliance in section 29 of the 1934 Act might amount to a barrier. Id. at 252.
226
See Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, Non-Binding Voting for Shareholder Proposals,
66 J. FIN. 1579, 1579-80 (2011) (reporting that even despite a recent increase in support for shareholder proposals, the percentage of proposals receiving a majority vote
stood at only 21.2% in 2006).
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cost of enforcement to the taxpayers? The answer is no. We will see in
Part V that the shareholders also pay for public enforcement.
Should the shareholders vote nay, we would go forward with a
conditional experiment on antifraud enforcement. Say, for example,
that the shareholders vote nay, but then have second thoughts after
public enforcement capability is cut back. Today’s institutional
shareholders are coordinated enough to bring back FOTM in a single
proxy season. At the same time, we note that voting nay might jolt the
SEC and Congress into a beneficial reassessment of the resources devoted to public enforcement.
If the plebiscite yielded a separating equilibrium, with some companies or some industries opting in and while others opted out, creating dynamic change over time, we presumably would benefit from an
information-enriched environment that teaches us something about the
benefits and costs of different modes of fraud enforcement. Shareholder confusion would not be problem; FOTM status would be easily
ascertained, alongside the P/E ratio and the state of incorporation, on
shareholder information services like Bloomberg, Yahoo, or Hoover’s.
If our thought experiment is reasonable, there is little basis on
which to defend FOTM in its present, mandatory posture as a corporate governance institution.
D. Fraud on the Market and the Mandatory-Disclosure System
Our opting-out discussion avoids the approach to mandatoryenabling issues that prevails in the securities regulation literature. In
the securities context, contractual choice tends to be seen as a monolithic proposition with mandatory disclosure and a private right of action on the one hand, and a complete absence of federal mandates
on the other. We suspect that FOTM incidentally benefits from this
either/or situation. The minority of commentators who would eliminate FOTM advocate a broader rollback of federal securities laws and
the existing mandatory-disclosure system. They project a contractual
big bang, with regulation of disclosure remitted to market intermedia227
ries toward the end of dynamic, responsive, contractual governance.

227

See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. REV. 279, 315-18 (2000) (arguing for a deregulation of securities markets that
could lead to the elimination of most significant federal regulation); Paul G. Mahoney,
The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1457-62 (1997) (providing arguments in
favor of regulatory competition); see also Pritchard, supra note 138, at 247-49 (advocating that shareholders at least partially opt out of the FOTM presumption).
LIF.
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Recent defenses of FOTM give us a mirror-image view. FOTM proponents frame their case as a follow-up to a defense of the mandatory228
disclosure system.
The either/or is not useful and is a sticking point; the issues are
layered and separable. The narrowest question, the one we address
here, is whether FOTM makes sense as the formulation of the reliance
requirement in private antifraud suits, assuming a judicially implied
private right of action exists. Addressing this question requires taking
up a related question regarding the role private litigation plays in securities law enforcement. But it does not require us to confront the
desirability of the mandatory-disclosure regime. We here assume a
positive answer to that question, leaving the global question of contract versus mandate to another day.
IV. POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY
We have pursued three policy justifications for FOTM without getting a favorable result. Policy vacuity does not necessarily imply political vulnerability, however. Indeed, Congress once considered eliminating FOTM and decided against it.
One of the PSLRA’s
229
predecessor bills, the Securities Litigation Reform Act, would have
imposed an actual reliance requirement on private securities plain230
tiffs, along with a “loser pays” rule for attorneys’ fees and elimina231
The provisions were dropped betion of liability for recklessness.
fore the bill was reported out of committee, apparently in response to
232
objections raised by Arthur Levitt, then the chairman of the SEC.
An inference arises: FOTM enjoys a shield of legitimacy even in adverse political climates. This Part looks into the sources of this political credibility and identifies residual problems that could, given a
conducive political climate, occasion further legislative constraints.
Section A connects FOTM to the politics of management accountability. FOTM has political legitimacy because managers are empo228

See Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 252-68 (advocating continued mandatory
disclosure and addressing civil liability in the mandatory regime); Zohar Goshen &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Litigation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 719,
766-71 (2006) (voicing support for FOTM theory, even in inefficient markets).
229
See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing amendments to several federal liability laws).
230
Id. § 203.
231
Id. § 204.
232
John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 348-49 (1996).
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wered actors in society and in the economy, and FOTM holds out a
means by which to challenge business decisions gone wrong. Its
promise to enforce the law against fraudsters strengthens the case.
Section B shows how FOTM, with its putative goal of shareholder
compensation, also benefits from shareholders’ emergence as a politically salient interest group. That a different enforcement mode might
more effectively challenge management decisions, hold fraudsters accountable, or protect the shareholder interest makes FOTM contestable without denuding it of political legitimacy. Section C turns to the
contrary political agenda. Management went to Congress to make
class action lawyers’ lives harder with the PSLRA and stands ready to
lobby again for further constraints. Outright abolition of FOTM,
however, is not on any of the current wish lists. This suggests a curious alignment of interests between management and the plaintiffs’
bar. For managers, an inconvenient but ineffectual enforcement tool
may be better suited than any politically plausible alternative regime,
particularly a regime directed to enforcement against individuals rather than companies.
A. Management Accountability
Corporate law, ever since Berle and Means, has depicted managers
as private actors who wield considerable social and economic power in
society without being subject to accountability constraints comparable
233
to those imposed on public actors. Policy debates have focused ever
since on appropriate modes of public and private constraint.
The intensity of the debates waxes and wanes with the health of
the economy. When companies produce successfully, and the economy grows, so does management’s legitimacy. Thus a buoyant stock
234
market cleared the way for the PSLRA.
On the other hand, eco235
nomic reversals trigger new demands for accountability. The FCPA,
Sarbanes-Oxley, and, most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act each ad-

233

See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
PRIVATE PROPERTY 249 (1933); see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J.
CORP. L. 99, 118-22, 147-50 (2008) (summarizing Berle’s theories and the evolution of
those theories today).
234
See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 213, at 672 fig.VII (illustrating the correlation between the growth of the stock market and the enactment of the PLSRA and
other related statutes).
235
See id. at 661-69 (describing the new legislation passed as a result of the Watergate and Enron scandals).
AND
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dressed such downside demands. The federal securities laws did also;
according to a “creation story” told at the SEC, the 1933 and 1934 Acts
responded to market failure and the need to defuse “public resent236
Note
ment of economic privilege” in the midst of the Depression.
that the story asserts a common interest between managers and securities law enforcers: when enforcers hold managers accountable, they
do so for the sake of preserving a system that empowers the managers
in the first place.
The SEC creation story, with its emphasis on the social settlement
and its overtones of class warfare, is nicely suited to the plaintiffs’ bar.
Securities class actions allow upstart lawyers to pursue and bring down
the social structure’s top dogs. The class warfare story is dated, but it
still resonates, if only because a subgroup of corporate actors abuses
its position and perpetrates fraud, while its members line their own
237
The abuse of position account also circulated at the time
pockets.
the securities laws were enacted, but as a point of criticism. William
Douglas, then a Yale law professor, described the shortcomings of the
about-to-be-enacted federal securities statute in an article in the Har238
He described the scandals that had come to light
vard Law Review.
in the aftermath of the Great Crash of 1929, variously involving secret
loans, undisclosed profit-sharing plans, self-dealing contracts, and in239
sider trading. Mandatory-disclosure rules, he argued, would not be
enough to prevent the repeat of such sorry spectacles in the next cyc240
lical market rise. Justice Douglas has been proven correct again and
again, and the securities law regime has been adjusted repeatedly to
deal with the problem. FOTM is one of those adjustments.
More generally, even in our market-oriented, deregulatory age,
private economic and social empowerment generates demands for rec-

236

Langevoort, supra note 206, at 1329.
See Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 159,
160 (2007) (“[C]orporate managerial power . . . can be used to satiate the selfinterested thirst of greedy CEOs at the expense of shareholders.”). Management greed
and manipulation are standard themes in the literature of FOTM defense. See, e.g., James
C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95
GEO. L.J. 653, 691 (2007) (showing how defendants can circumvent the loss-causation
requirement to cover up fraud by simultaneously disclosing positive results).
238
See William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 132934 (1934) (noting that the upcoming legislation was a step in the right direction but
that it was still a “task half done”).
239
Id. at 1306.
240
Id.
237
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241

titude and accountability.
Private antifraud litigation addresses this
demand. That its upstart private attack dogs never go for the top dogs’
242
jugulars does not seem to matter; the performative value is there.
All of this teaches an important lesson: it is corporate managers
themselves who keep the game going for FOTM. They do so partly by
virtue of their structural position, and, to this extent, they are not to
blame. But they also do so partly by virtue of the actions of the subset
of miscreants in their group. To this extent, FOTM is their own fault.
Ironically, managers also can be seen as incidental beneficiaries of
FOTM. When fraud and misuse of corporate authority trigger policy
questions, progressives look for ex ante regulatory responses that disempower managers generally by constraining business judgments and
243
reducing rents. Conservative politicians and administrators, in contrast, prefer to redirect political demands against management to
tougher enforcement of existing regulations. The redirection averts
substantive regulation that would constrain discretion in business poli244
FOTM, by combining a show of enforcement and a licymaking.
mited threat of disruption, contributes to the deregulatory equilibrium.
B. Shareholder Solicitude
Shareholder solicitude occupies the other side of FOTM’s political coin. It is wrought into the structure of antifraud litigation as the
“right” in the private right of action. Then–SEC Chairman Harold
Williams described the private enforcement function in 1979: “Private
actions, brought by aggrieved individuals to protect their own rights,
supplement the Commission’s own enforcement program, and significantly increase the likelihood that securities law violations will be chal-

241

See also Coglianese, supra note 237, at 160-61 (questioning corporations’ legitimacy, namely, their integrity and trustworthiness, in the face of the immense power
they wield); cf. Douglas, supra note 238, at 1327-28 (outlining potential reforms that
would better protect investors).
242
For a contrasting discussion of private securities litigation and management
accountability, which looks to justification rather than description, see Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV.
63, 99-106 (2008).
243
See Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1142 (“To the progressive, Enron is a story
about arrogance and abuse, and a call for wide-ranging reforms designed to reduce the
rents from corporate stewardship.”); see also Coglianese, supra note 237, at 161-62 (distinguishing between corporate regulation, which is imposed by the government, and
corporate governance, which includes internal board procedures).
244
See Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1141-42 (describing the viewpoints of both
conservatives and progressives).
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245

lenged and corrected.” Here the “right” is not merely the means to
the end of a policy goal—it is a substantive entitlement in itself.
Shareholder solicitude, thus embedded in the tort, only recently
began gaining political traction. Before then, the shareholder interest
was seen as distinct from the public interest. Another look at Adolf
Berle illustrates this viewpoint. Berle believed that management power should be contained to promote the public interest. He simultaneously promoted a model of corporate governance built around a
246
shareholder trust, which was calculated to limit management selfdealing. But Berle also drew a sharp distinction between the shareholder interest and the public interest: shareholder welfare could be
a proxy for social welfare only when shares were equitably distributed
247
That was not the case then, nor is it
among the public as a whole.
the case now.
248
The FCPA, enacted in 1977, holds out a legislative (and political) example of separation between shareholder and public interests.
The FCPA, like Sarbanes-Oxley, responded to political demands for
management accountability following a series of high-profile scandals.
In the FCPA’s case, the scandals were “questionable foreign payments”
made by corporations to actors abroad in connection with the sale of
big-ticket American products—payments discovered incidentally in
249
the course of the Watergate investigation. The public response cast
managers as irresponsible public actors: corporate corruption was

245

44 SEC ANN. REP., at vii (1978), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_
report/1978.pdf.
246
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 233, at 248 (paraphrasing an underlying thesis
of corporate law, namely that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from
statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears”).
247
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 233, at 142-43.
248
Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
249
See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 79, 86-87 (2005) (chronicling the history of the FCPA). During the Watergate investigations of 1973 –1974, the special prosecutor discovered corporate political slush
funds that evaded normal accounting controls. See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE
WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 63 (1982). The SEC announced a
voluntary disclosure program, and admissions by over 300 companies resulted. See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 185, 187-188 (1994). It was the Watergate era, and the public demanded
a cleanup of corporate corruption. See, e.g., DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (1999).
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unacceptable, even if it occurred abroad in pursuit of shareholder
value at home. Given a public willing to impose new ethical standards
on managers at the expense of shareholders, Congress imposed re250
sponsibility by law.
Sarbanes-Oxley admits of a similar reading. Professor Langevoort
points out that even as Sarbanes-Oxley is nominally investor protective, it accords the shareholders no new powers. Instead, it imposes
good-governance constraints on businesses with an eye toward dulling
overly sharp incentives and keeping corporate risk taking within so251
cially acceptable limits. Viewed this way, Sarbanes-Oxley is no more
about shareholder value maximization than was the FCPA. Like the
FCPA, it imposes public accountability on large corporations to create
252
public legitimacy.
But, unlike the FCPA, Sarbanes-Oxley was prompted by scandals
unrelated to elected officials, scandals instead tied to spectacular
253
losses at a number of large enterprises.
These shareholder losses
figured into the political motivation. Stock ownership had become
more widespread between 1977 and 2002, albeit collectivized in the
form of pension and mutual fund interests. Politicians, moreover,
254
had begun to cater to the “Investor Class” and to promote an “own255
ership society” in which individually vested pension savings figured
importantly. So when Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, even though
retail investors viewed as an interest group continued to have little in256
fluence, the shareholder qua shareholder had edged much closer to
250

See Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
414, 418 (2004) (noting that as societies grow rich they prove more willing to pay for
ethical behavior through enforcement).
251
See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1817, 1828-29 (2007) (“SOX is less about redistributing private power as diffusing
it through more checks, balances, and sunlight.”).
252
See id. at 1820 (“SOX’s most important effects may be less about investor protection than about renegotiating the boundary between the public and private spaces
in big corporations, a much deeper ideological issue.”).
253
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005).
254
In 2004, one third of American voters described themselves as “investors,” and
national politicians now cater to the so-called “Investor Class.” Richard S. Dunham &
Ann Therese Palmer, Just Who’s in the ‘Investor Class?’, BUS. WK., Sept. 6, 2004, at 42-43.
255
See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: America’s Ownership Society:
Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html (outlining President George W. Bush’s policies favoring an “Ownership Society”).
256
See Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union:
Lessons from the U.S. Experience (explaining that retail investors have had little political
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the median voter and loomed large politically. Shareholder empowerment, missing in Sarbanes-Oxley, would follow in the next
round—the Dodd-Frank Act, which enables the placement of shareholder board nominees in management proxy statements and accords
257
the shareholders “say on pay” rights, among other things.
The Congress that enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, while granting no new
powers to shareholders, did find other, innovative ways to cater to
their interests. Consider in this regard the Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief Act of 2002 (Fee Relief Act), a tax relief measure for
258
the investor class.
The fees in question were those that fund the
SEC—fees collected from exchange transactions and in connection
with SEC registrations. Fee revenues had been in excess of the SEC’s
259
annual budget for many years, and the excess had disappeared into
the Treasury. Congress enacted the Fee Relief Act to align the fee
revenues and the cost of running the SEC with the goal of reducing
fees. The Fair Funds provision in Sarbanes-Oxley was similarly moti260
Historically, the SEC had endeavored to return profits disvated.
gorged by defendants in its enforcement actions to victimized investors. When a defendant paid a penalty, in contrast, the SEC remitted
the amount to the Treasury. Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Funds provision
charges the SEC to endeavor to return penalty monies to injured in261
vestors, elevating the interests of shareholder victims over those of
the public fisc.
Significantly, Fair Funds disbursements mimic FOTM economics.
As we have seen, SEC penalties tend to be paid by corporate defendants, as are FOTM settlements. A Fair Funds distribution to a subset
of shareholders is every bit as much an exercise in pocket shifting as is
payment of a FOTM settlement. The political implication is as power-

clout, except during times of perceived scandal), in INVESTOR PROTECTION IN EUROPE
489, 491 (Guido Ferrarrini & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2006).
257
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 951, 953–55, 971, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-4, 78n-a, 78n-1 (West
Supp. 2 2011).
258
Pub. L. No. 107-123, 115 Stat. 2390 (codified at 15 U.S.C.).
259
See infra text accompanying notes 346-67.
260
See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring that civil judgment penalties be
added to associated disgorgement requirements).
261
The charge is conditioned on a concomitant disgorgement order, and the decision to remit is left to the agency’s discretion in any given case. See id. § 7246(a)
(“[T]he amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of the
Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of
the victims of such violation.”).
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ful as the underlying policy analysis is faulty: the Fair Funds legislation, by tracking FOTM, implicitly endorses it.
So long as catering to shareholder interests appears advantageous
to Congress, it is difficult to imagine a political coalition forming to
eliminate FOTM. Dodd-Frank, although it does nothing to enhance
the present position of securities plaintiffs, signals a tilt in their position.
Among the many studies commissioned by the statute, two concern private securities litigation and look into the possibility of overruling Su262
preme Court decisions that restrict the scope of FOTM actions.
We close with a caveat respecting the politics of shareholder solicitude. Even as we think that current politics protect FOTM from frontal attack, concern for the shareholder interest means different things
to different people and holds out a range of policy implications.
These concerns can be deployed to undermine securities law enforcement activity. For example, management advocates who propose
new measures to limit FOTM invoke pocket shifting and solicitude for
263
the payor shareholders.
Consider in this regard an enforcement scenario acted out at the
SEC post–Sarbanes-Oxley. In 2006, the SEC articulated a set of guidelines to govern the imposition of fines against corporations, specifying
264
nine factors to use in assessing an appropriate penalty. Most of the
items on the list were standard enforcement concerns such as culpa265
bility, cooperation, detection, and injury inflicted. But the SEC singled out two concerns as paramount, one tending to support a penalty
and the other tending to oppose it: (1) in favor of a penalty, the presence (or absence) of a “direct and material benefit” to the corporation from the offense, such as through reduced expenses or increased
revenues; and (2) against a penalty, whether a penalty will cause addi262

One study, commissioned by the Government Accountability Office, will consider liability for aiders and abettors as well as secondary actors, implicitly questioning
the Supreme Courts’ rulings in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994), and Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148 (2008). See Dodd-Frank Act § 929Z, 124 Stat. 1375, 1871 (requiring the
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study analyzing aiding and abetting liability in securities laws).
263
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT AND THE PATH TO REFORM 41 (2008), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1213 (“Congress also
should address the fact that payments by defendant companies punish innocent existing shareholders, while investors (often large, diversified investors) who sold their
shares at an inflated price before the disclosure of the fraud reap windfall gains.”).
264
See Press Release, supra note 148.
265
Id.
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266

tional harm to shareholders who have committed no violation.
Shareholder solicitude motivates both of these factors. The first factor
attaches penalties to cases where the payor shareholders benefitted
from the fraud, while the second weighs against penalties in cases
267
where the payor shareholders neither participated nor benefitted.
The two factors quickly came to dominate SEC enforcement policy. At the Commission’s insistence, the enforcement staff had to qualify a penalty with an affirmative showing of tangible benefits to the
268
company, usually based on an event study. The result, unsurprisingly, was that it became more difficult to impose fines in pure marketfraud situations. The policy also discouraged the SEC staff from undertaking complex cases, inhibited the imposition of penalties for egregious conduct, and blurred the distinction between penalties and dis269
gorgements. Chairman Christopher Cox followed up in 2007 with a
second internal requirement: Commission approval of a penalty range
in certain cases in advance of the staff’s commencement of settlement
270
This operated as a wedge with which the Commission
discussions.
271
could delay disfavored proceedings and effect penalty reductions.
The SEC’s penalty-qualification requirements could have been
272
lifted straight out of the policy playbook of a management lobbyist.
Both requirements were criticized in a 2009 Government Accountabil-

266

Id.
For a discussion of the tradeoff, see Chester S. Spatt, An Informal Perspective on
the Economics and Regulation of Securities Markets, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 127, 138 (2010).
268
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION
OF RESOURCES IN THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 41 (2009), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d09358.pdf (reporting the heavy burden placed on the Enforcement Division to show corporate benefit when seeking to impose a penalty).
269
See id. at 42-43 (relating the reported effects of the two factors on enforcement
incentives and success rates).
270
See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the
Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy Conference (Apr. 13, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041207cc.htm (“So in a handful of cases where the need for national consistency is greatest, we’re reviving what had
been a long standing policy of the SEC for all cases for many years—that Commission
approval be obtained before settlement discussions are commenced.”).
271
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 39-43 (reporting
that SEC investigators and enforcement attorneys had incentives not to seek penalties
due to the obstacles to their approval).
272
See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 41 (urging Congress, on behalf of the business community, to impose penalties only very cautiously).
267
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273

ity Office Report. The present SEC Chair, Mary Schapiro, lifted the
274
advance notice requirement upon taking office in 2009. Since then,
the SEC’s Enforcement Division has been reorganizing itself, reporting enhanced efficiency and results, including stepped-up amounts of
275
both penalties and disgorgements. It is not clear what, if anything,
this change implies about the continuing application of the 2006 penalty guidelines. We have discovered no public statement regarding
their present status.
C. Agency Problems
Two different groups of private agents populate the FOTM fact
pattern: plaintiffs’ lawyers and corporate managers. This section
brings them into our political economy. These two groups stare at
each other across a field of combat. Plaintiffs’ lawyers favor FOTM as
it is (or was), while managers would like to pick up where the PSLRA
left off and constrain it still further. At the same time, neither group
of agents would want Congress to eliminate FOTM completely.
We start with the plaintiffs’ bar, which has its own legitimacy problem. Those in charge of an enforcement institution founded on concerns about management accountability must be accountable in turn.
Unfortunately, the class action lawsuit is not an institution well suited
to this end. Plaintiffs’ attorneys—in theory the shareholders’ agents—
in practice make litigation decisions in a zone of discretion. When
they seem to abuse their discretion and impose deadweight costs on
defendant companies without corresponding benefits to shareholders,
discretion-constraining legislation may follow in the right political
276
climate. For example, a bull stock market and a class of favored
companies in the technology sector combined in 1995 to focus con-

273

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 41 (“[S]ome investigative attorneys came to see the Commission as less of an ally in bringing enforcement actions and more of a barrier.”)
274
Id. at 36.
275
See Robert Khuzami, Director, Div. of Enforcements, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Speech to the Society of American Business Editors and Writers (Mar. 19,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch031910rsk.htm
(“[F]ast-forward one year, and the Division of Enforcement, and the Commission as a
whole, are in a very different place.”).
276
See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 213, at 671-72 (charting the value of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average alongside the political maneuvers that led to the
PLSRA’s passage).
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gressional attention on abusive practices of securities plaintiffs—in
277
particular, the strike suit.
The PSLRA resulted, and with it an experiment in attorney agency278
cost control in the form of the lead plaintiff provision.
This provision takes the selection of the class action’s named plaintiff out of the
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ hands, makes it contestable, and vests the decision
in a court charged to presume that good litigation governance follows
279
Thus confrom “the largest financial interest in the relief sought.”
structed, the PSLRA operates on the assumption that a financial interest in the stock in itself imports incentives to control litigation
280
Experience has taught a different lesson, which folagency costs.
lows from the economics of institutional investing. Mutual funds have
competitive reasons to avoid investing time and resources in shareholder activism and have business reasons to keep friendly channels
281
open to the corporate sector. They accordingly have refrained from
282
Public pension funds, in constepping forward as lead plaintiffs.
trast, are managed by public servants who have incentives to build
283
reputations as governance activists.
Unsurprisingly, lead plaintiffs
284
have often come from this sector, even though they lack the pure
financial incentives contemplated by the PSLRA.
Problems can arise when selective, rather than financial, incentives
prompt a principal to monitor an agent. The lead plaintiff provision
held out just such an invitation, and the plaintiffs’ law firms readily ac-

277

Thompson & Sale, supra note 60, at 884-85.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006).
279
Id.
280
Institutional investors commonly have the largest financial stakes in the larges
securities class action settlements. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money
Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2088-94 (1995).
281
See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 474 (1991) (noting that incurring the costs associated
with attempting to check and control corporate governance is inimical to the end goal
of a passive indexed portfolio—being the least-cost producer).
282
Choi & Thompson, supra note 58, at 1504.
283
See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1914-18 (1995) (describing
the “financial and selective incentives” for public and private institutions).
284
See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 330
(2008) (“With the adoption of the PSLRA and the creation of the lead plaintiff provision, institutional investors and public pension funds in particular have become increasingly active, serving as lead plaintiffs in a higher percentage of cases every year . . . .”).
278
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cepted it. As a result, different pension funds have developed longterm ties with different law firms. The law firms, looking to maintain
these ties, make strategic political contributions in the pension funds’
285
states. This “pay to play” practice has spurred a new round of corrup286
High-profile criminal protion allegations from FOTM opponents.
ceedings against prominent plaintiffs’ lawyers alleging improper pay287
ments to named plaintiffs add to the aura of corruption.
Let us assume that any pay-to-play practices are brought under
288
control (legislation has been introduced ). Given that assumption,
FOTM may very well emerge from the long process of congressional
containment with its legitimacy enhanced. Strike suits do not appear
289
to be as salient a problem in the wake of the PSLRA. Without a basis

285

See Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & Adam C. Pritchard, The Price of
Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527047 (showing that while
pension fund supervision implies lower attorneys’ fees, the differential disappears
when one controls for campaign contributions made to officials with influence over
state pension funds). For a skeptical approach to pay-to-play allegations, see David H.
Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions?
An Empirical Study (NYU Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ & Org., Research Paper No. 0928, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1432497.
286
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 30-34 (describing the corruption that emerges in a pay-to-play legal culture); RICHARD M. KOVACEVICH ET AL., THE FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL
COMPETITIVENESS 69 (2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/cec/pdfs/
FINALCompetitivenessReport.pdf (recommending that Congress should amend the
PSLRA to eliminate pay to play).
287
See Jonathan D. Glater, High-Profile Trial Lawyer Agrees to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2008, at C1 (reporting that Melvyn I. Weiss, a well-known attorney, agreed to
plead guilty “to [making] hidden side payments to plaintiffs in class-action lawsuits
filed by his firm”); Michael Parrish, Leading Class-Action Lawyer is Sentenced to Two Years
in Kickback Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at C1 (“William S. Lerach . . . was sentenced Monday two years in prison and ordered to forfeit $7.75 million for concealing
illegal payments to a plaintiff in the class-action lawsuits . . . .”).
288
Legislation has been proposed that would require disclosure of all payments,
fees, and contributions between law firms and lead plaintiffs. In addition, a competitive bidding process would be added as an alternative means of choosing lead counsel.
Securities Litigation Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act, H.R. 5463, 110th
Cong. §§ 3–4 (2008).
289
See Choi, supra note 63, at 616 (comparing matched sets of firms that were sued
and not sued pre- and post-PSLRA to suggest that “plaintiffs’ attorneys post-PSLRA
shifted away from cases requiring lengthy and costly investigation prior to the filing of
suit toward cases with more obvious indicia of fraud”); Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen,
Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and Securities Litigation 25 (Univ. of S. Cal.
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-7, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=536963 (finding that the PSLRA deters both frivolous and
meritorious litigation).
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for credible allegations of corruption, antiplaintiff politics would lose
impetus. Litigation would fall back into the more nebulous politics of
deregulation, taking a place on long legislative agendas as one of a
number of regulatory costs businesses would prefer to do without.
Indeed, current proposals concerning securities litigation appear
290
as items on lengthy corporate legislative wish lists. National competitiveness, particularly in light of international securities listings, is the
291
A string of proposals
across-the-board policy imperative of choice.
regarding securities litigation awaits the light of day. The number-one
292
agenda item is an arbitration opt-in. Also on the wishlist are credit
293
in damages calculations for Fair Funds paid out, tighter controls on
294
parallel actions in state courts, a defendant’s interlocutory appeal on

290

See, e.g., BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 39, at 19-25 (recommending national priorities, methods for leveling the international playing field, and ways to preserve financial preeminence); COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 16 (2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (recommending policy changes in shareholder rights); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 263, at 42 (advocating greater transparency in the settlement
process and more widespread use of arbitration).
291
See, e.g., BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 39, at 100 (“Congress should bolster America’s long-term competitiveness by enacting legislative reforms to securities
law that will eliminate inappropriate lawsuits without undermining relevant substantive
rights.”); COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 290, at 109-12 (recommending an opt-in to arbitration in the context of across-the-board reform proposals
designed to make U.S. capital markets more attractive to foreign companies).
292
Management would like the privilege to amend corporate charters to opt into
arbitration of securities fraud claims. Alternatively, companies should be able to opt
into nonjury trials. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 290, at 110
(recommending that “shareholders should be able to choose their remedies . . . including providing for arbitration (with or without class action procedures)”).
293
Management argues that a double recovery results when a company makes a
payment to the SEC and also makes a settlement payment in a parallel class action.
The argument is that corporate defendants should receive a damages credit equal to
any Fair Funds paid out. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 290, at
80 (recommending that the SEC “limit the amount of damages recoverable through
class actions when the SEC provides victim compensation with funds obtained through
a Fair Funds remedy”); COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE
21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 89 (2007) (“The Commission recommends that the SEC adopt a formal policy that prohibits duplicate payments from Fair
Funds and private litigation on similar claims. Specifically, any amount investors receive
from a Fair Fund should offset the amount that they are allowed to collect as damages
in private securities litigation on similar claims.”); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 263, at 43 (“[P]rivate damages awards should be offset in the first
instance by any Fair Funds collected by the SEC for compensating shareholders.”).
294
Management has also been watching institutional investors opt out of federal
class actions only to bring parallel actions in state court. See supra note 120 and ac-

BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

146

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

11/17/2011 6:02 PM

[Vol. 160: 69

295

denial of motion to dismiss, pleading particularity for loss causa296
297
tion, and damages limitations.
These proposals lie dormant, ready for enactment in a favorable
political environment. If the past is any guide, such an environment
298
presupposes an expanding economy and a rising stock market.
It
follows that the proposals may be gathering dust for some time. Indeed, none found their way into the Dodd-Frank Act.
D. Summary and Analysis
FOTM’s political economy also has undergone changes in recent
years as a result of developments in the political economy of shareholding. FOTM continues to enjoy the protection of the management-accountability imperative that brought securities regulation into
existence during the Depression. Because the shareholder interest
now registers politically, FOTM’s superficial qualities of shareholder
friendliness enhance its stature—congressional gestures in the shareholders’ direction validate FOTM by mimicking its economics. But
shareholder solicitude is a two-sided coin: FOTM’s opponents point
out that innocent shareholders pay the compensation.
We emerge in a political equipoise with a narrow stretch of contestable territory. The plaintiffs’ side has had the upper hand recently, convincing Congress to commission studies under DoddFrank that look to roll back inconvenient Supreme Court opinions.
The management interest bides its time, looking for opportunities to

companying text. It asks Congress to close off the state court route altogether, or, failing that, to stay state court actions until final resolution of a federal class action. See
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 39 (noting the harmful effect of state-law claims filed in state court that are not class action, which circumvent
federal regulation).
295
Management argues that it is unfair that a dismissed plaintiff can appeal when
a defendant losing on a dismissal motion cannot. See BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra
note 39, at 104 (arguing that litigating parties should be able to appeal interlocutory
judgments immediately to the circuit courts); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
supra note 263, at 35 (advocating equal access to interlocutory appeals). This doubtless has less to do with fairness than settlement value.
296
See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 37 (stating that
Congress should “mandat[e] that plaintiffs plead loss causation with the same level of
specificity currently reserved for scienter”).
297
Management would abolish aggregated damages in favor of a regime based
on actual submission and verification by class members with any undistributed settlement funds returned to the defendant. Id. at 34, 41. The pocket-shifting argument is also invoked.
298
See supra text accompanying notes 234-50.
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reduce FOTM’s scope and salience without creating new public enforcement initiatives.
Interestingly, outright abolition of FOTM is not on any current
management wishlist. No doubt political expediency has something to
do with this. However, there may also be a juncture at which management’s interest intersects with that of the plaintiffs’ bar. Suppose that
FOTM’s termination was a possibility and gave rise to a perception of an
enforcement gap. This in turn might lead to pressure for stepped-up
public enforcement. Given this scenario, management might prefer
FOTM constraint to FOTM termination. As between a private action
safely nested in enterprise liability and a public enforcement resource
that could move in the direction of direct actions against individuals,
management’s interest clearly lies with the former. More generally,
FOTM increases managers’ legitimacy by disempowering them, even as
it presents little threat to individual malefactors. Anti-FOTM activists
in the business lobby should be careful what they wish for.
Our account has only mentioned the SEC in passing. As the
agency responsible for enforcing the securities laws, it occupies a central position in the political economy of FOTM. We turn to it in the
next Part, first taking an historical look at the SEC’s funding and then
considering its role as a political actor in the battle over FOTM.
V. THE SEC AND REFORM
We have seen that FOTM survives and prospers even though it
doesn’t work from a public policy perspective. It prevails in the courts
by virtue of stare decisis. Outside, in the world of political contestability, it occupies a safe spot amid opposing forces in equipoise. Whatever its actual policy shortcomings, FOTM retains associations with powerful justificatory concepts, such as management accountability and
shareholder protection. Its opponents, with a political wind at their
backs, have proved able to delimit but not eliminate it. Meanwhile,
law reform proponents focus on superior alternative modes of private
299
enforcement, with few mentioning the simpler expedient of doing
300
away with FOTM’s reliance presumption. This hesitance stems from

299

See supra note 121.
Professors Langevoort and Pritchard are exceptions. See Langevoort, Corporate
Executives, supra note 13, at 656 (imagining abandonment of the presumption of reliance “[w]ithout necessarily endorsing it as a reform”); Pritchard, supra note 138, at
248 (suggesting a shareholder opt-out); see also Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor
Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, 63 BUS. LAW. 25, 54 (2007) (suggesting
300
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the assumption that public enforcement resources are inadequate to
contain fraud, a situation deemed natural and inevitable. Given the
limited public apparatus, it follows that any private enforcement is
301
better than none at all.
The inadequate resources claim sounded as loudly as ever in 2011.
The Dodd-Frank Act directed the engagement of a consultant to re302
view the SEC’s structure and operations. The consultant confirmed
303
the inadequacy of the agency’s resources. The report posed a stark
choice to Congress: either provide the agency with funds sufficient to
support its required capabilities or cut back on its responsibilities to fit
304
Any hopes that Congress would choose the
the available funds.
305
former option were dashed during the budget fracas of 2011.
This Part reconsiders the inadequate resources assertion, despite
the consultant’s recent confirmation. The objective is not to controvert the assertion but rather to reframe the question, inquiring into
the degree of resource deficiency instead of asking a yes or no ques-

abandonment of the presumption respecting third parties); cf. Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 591-98
(1997) (recommending no change in the reliance presumption, but suggesting stricter
scienter and materiality standards for the largest issuers).
301
In an empirical multicountry comparison, La Porta asserts that a combination
of disclosure mandates taken together with private enforcement remedies better predicts market robustness than public-enforcer empowerment. See La Porta et al., supra
note 184, at 20 (hypothesizing that “public enforcement plays a modest role at best” in
structuring stock markets, while, “in contrast, the development of stock markets is
strongly associated with extensive disclosure requirements and a relatively low burden
of proof on investors seeking to recover damages”). Jackson and Roe rebut this by
showing a stronger connection between market robustness and public enforcement
resources. More to the point, Jackson and Roe show that disclosure has a significant
relationship to market capitalization where private liability does not. Jackson & Roe,
supra note 1, at 217-19.
302
Dodd-Frank Act § 967(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-4 (West Supp. 2 2011). The
directive was incidental to Dodd-Frank’s imposition of new administrative burdens on
the agency.
303
BOS. CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 165-69 (2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2011/967study.pdf.
304
Id. at 9. Boston Consulting examined the SEC from an organizational perspective, recommending numerous infrastructural improvements. The report estimates
that the SEC would require an additional $200 to $300 million to implement the first
phase of improvements. Id. at 147. If new funding is not forthcoming, the report recommends that the SEC delegate certain rulemaking and enforcement functions to
self-regulatory organizations. Id. at 150-53. This would mean, for example, devolution
of broker-dealer and investment advisor examinations. The report recommends no
changes respecting antifraud enforcement.
305
See infra note 312.
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tion. The policy literature on antifraud takes the yes-or-no approach
and makes a strong-form inadequacy assertion: the public glass is
empty, period. This was indeed the situation when the Supreme
Court first implied a private right of action under the federal securities laws in 1964. But public resources have increased greatly since
306
then—particularly during the last decade —so much so as to again
raise the question about relative reliance on public and private enforcement. Here is that question: is it plausible to suggest that the
SEC could pick up any enforcement slack occasioned by the removal
of the FOTM presumption? This Part answers in the affirmative, suggesting that FOTM’s elimination could be paired with an increase in
public enforcement funding for a net improvement in deterrence at
no added cost to shareholders.
Section A conducts an historical survey of the SEC budget and
shows that the agency has emerged in recent years as an expansive
and powerful enforcement apparatus. To the extent additional agency resources would be needed to make up for diminished reliance on
private enforcement, funding would be readily available from the
SEC’s dedicated income sources at no cost to the taxpayers. As with
private enforcement, the funding ultimately comes from shareholder
pockets, provoking an intriguing comparative question: which enforcement mode, public or private, makes better dollar-for-dollar use
of the shareholders’ money? This Part suggests that shareholders
would be better served if they funded greater SEC enforcement in a
system without a private side FOTM presumption available against
nontrading issuers. Inadequate public enforcement is neither natural
nor inevitable.
Section B explores the institutional implications of this analysis. A
shift to a well-equipped public enforcer presupposes an administrative
commitment at the SEC and a political commitment in Congress. As
between the two, primary responsibility falls on the SEC as the agency
charged with the federal securities laws’ articulation, administration,
and enforcement. Although the SEC arguably has the power to eliminate FOTM through rulemaking, it certainly does not have the power

306

Precedent inquiries into SEC enforcement resources have found an increase in
the SEC’s resources. However, that increase has been accompanied by an even greater
increase in the number of enforcement actions filed. See Burch, supra note 242, at 12931 (looking at the years 2000–2002 and 2005); James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, SEC
Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 757-60 (2004) (describing
the SEC’s resource limitations in the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s and noting that,
since approximately 2002, many of those limitations have decreased).
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to set its own budget, so an enforcement initiative would require congressional support. We suggest that such cooperation could be secured through a tradeoff of more money for enforcement in exchange for FOTM’s removal, with a net benefit for the shareholders.
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the initiative we suggest aligns
well with present interests, either of actors at the SEC or in Congress.
We pose it as a structural possibility rather than as fruit on the tree for
immediate harvest.
Before proceeding, we pause to note what this Part does not contend. We do not claim that public enforcement is categorically supe307
rior to private enforcement, whether as regards securities law or any
other legal regime. Nor do we argue for across-the-board withdrawal of
private rights of action. We address only the shortcomings of FOTM.
A. Enforcement Resources
It is a truism that FOTM, despite its flaws, passes cost-benefit testing because the SEC needs a private enforcement supplement. Indeed, the SEC itself has long viewed the private supplement as essential to the accomplishment of its mission. In 1979, then–Chairman
Harold Williams, described the private enforcement role as follows:
[O]ur resources are inadequate to police all securities law violations
which may take place. As a result, our enforcement activities are designed not only to address specific wrongdoings, but also to alert the private sector as to the kinds of activities which we believe violate the securities laws.
Private actions . . . supplement the Commission’s own enforcement
program, and significantly increase the likelihood that securities law vi308
olations will be challenged and corrected.

Things have changed since 1979. The story that depicted private
plaintiffs as robust enforcers has imploded under sustained inspection.
Perhaps public enforcement conditions also have changed since 1979,
or, more to the point, since 1964, the year the Supreme Court ap309
It
proved the first securities law private-enforcement supplement.
accordingly is time to take another look at SEC enforcement capability.

307

For this line of argument, see Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 20,
at 2175-78.
308
44 SEC ANN. REP., supra note 245, at vii.
309
See supra note 4.
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1. The SEC’s Budget
In 1964, the SEC’s budget was $13.9 million; in 2010, its budget
310
was $1.12 billion.
Adjusting the 1964 number for inflation yields a
311
This in
directly comparable 1964 budget figure of $99.2 million.
turn yields a multiple of increase of 11.4. Figure 1 shows the SEC’s
budgets from 1964 to 2011 in 2011 dollars. Although large increases
do not occur annually, there is only one extended period of real decline, the period from 1976 to 1985, during which high inflation was
followed by the first Reagan administration’s political disfavor. At no
time has an anti-enforcement Congress or executive used budget cuts
312
to eviscerate the agency.
313

Figure 1: SEC Budgets (Inflation Adjusted), 1964–2010
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The calculation was performed using the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculator
to yield dollars in 2011. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://data.bls.gov.
311
See supra note 310.
312
SEC partisans recently made just this allegation, when Congress rejected the
agency’s 2012 budget request and some House members threatened cuts. See John J.
Curran & Jesse Hamilton, Schapiro SEC Seen Ineffectual Amid Dodd-Frank Funding Curbs,
BLOOMBERG MARKETS MAG. (Mar. 30, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-03-31/schapiro-sec-seen-ineffectual-amid-dodd-frank-funding-curbs.html. But
cuts have not been forthcoming. Under the present Continuing Resolution, the SEC
comes away with a $74 million increase. See Melanie Waddell, Congress Moves Budget
Vote to Thursday; SEC, CFTC See Budget Boost, ADVISOR ONE (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.advisorone.com/article/congress-moves-budget-vote-thursday-sec-cftc-seebudget-boost.
313
SEC budget data were collected from the SEC’s annual reports for the years
1964 –2010. See SEC ANN. REPS., available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml
(compiling the SEC’s annual reports).
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There are three instances of significant increase, all contemporaneous with high profile enforcement activity: the first in the mid 1970s,
coincident with the foreign payment scandals; the second in the early
1990s, after the Drexel Burnham action and the savings and loan crisis;
and the third in 2001 after Enron. Of the three, the post-Enron budget
increase is the most notable, amounting to a historic upward jump in
the amount of public resources devoted to securities law enforcement.
Figure 2: SEC Resources to Publicly Traded Stocks, 1964–2010
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Some claim that no matter what budget increases the SEC rece315
There is
ives, its available staff always lags behind market growth.
316
something to this, but not as much as once was the case. Figure 2
takes the SEC budget, expressed in real terms, and compares it to the
number of personnel employed by the agency as well as the number
of publicly traded stocks. In 1964, the SEC had budget lines for 1379
personnel; in 2010, it had lines for 3748 personnel. In 1964, there
were 2127 publicly traded stocks; in 2010, the number was 5701.

314

Id. The stock data were taken from the Center for Research in Securities Prices’s
US Stock & Index Databases, which collect data from the last business day of each year.
Access to the database is available for purchase at http://www.csrp.com/documentation/
product/stkind.
315
See Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 757-58 (detailing staff shortages at the
SEC notwithstanding budget increases).
316
The Boston Consulting Group opines that the SEC presently needs 375 to 425
additional full-time employees. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 302, at 196-97. Enforcement was not one of the divisions singled out as needing additional staff. Id.
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Prior to Enron, the three figures increase at relatively similar rates
with the SEC personnel figure lagging. Personnel finally returned to
parity with the number of stocks traded in 2009. In contrast, the
budget, once stoked in the wake of Enron, breaks out of the band with
a sharp increase.
Figure 3 tracks annual SEC personnel and budget figures, here
expressed in nominal terms, across the same period against the market value of publicly traded equities, which increased from
$490,134,900,000 to $17,526,408,500,000, also expressed in nominal
terms. The budget roughly tracks increases in equity market capitalization until the mid 1990s, when the stock market’s sudden rise outstripped budget increases. The pattern reverses after 2000, when the
market entered a period of backing and filling while the SEC enjoyed
more robust financing in the wake of Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley.
Figure 3: SEC Resources to Equity Market Capitalization,
317
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Figure 4 fleshes out the picture, using SEC-initiated enforcement
actions as a yardstick for agency productivity. These enforcement actions increased from forty-three per year in 1964 to 681 in 2010. The
numbers impress when compared to the personnel numbers, and stay
318
ahead of inflation-adjusted budget increases.
At the same time,

317

Id.
If the nominal budget numbers were used, the budget increases would outstrip
increases in enforcement activity.
318
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numbers of enforcement actions per dollar of resources never returned to the level achieved in the early 1970s—the complexity and
magnitude of the cases doubtless has something to do with this.
The numbers show a burst of activity in the wake of the collapse of
the 1960s bull market, followed by more moderate and steady increases with notable upticks after 1990 and again after Enron. The early
1990s increases may reflect a legislative adjustment, as Congress materially added to the SEC’s stock of enforcement weapons in the Securi319
ties Enforcement and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990. Before 1990,
Figure 4: SEC Resources to Enforcement Activity, 1964–2010
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the agency had only two choices in addressing violations of mandatory-disclosure rules outside of the public offering context—either
going to court for an injunction or proceeding administratively to request a corrective filing. The 1990 legislation added the administrative cease-and-desist order with an express provision for profit dis321
gorgement and opened doors for the agency to seek civil monetary
322
penalties outside of the insider-trading context.
319

Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C). The previous step-up in legislative authority, the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), addressed insider trading. For further discussion, see Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 746-48.
320
See supra note 313.
321
15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(a), 78u-3(e) (2006).
322
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3).
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Figure 5 offers another view of enforcement beginning in 1981,
when the SEC’s annual report first included the penalties and profit
323
disgorgements ordered in connection with its enforcement actions.
The sequence begins with $30 million in 1980, picks up magnitude af324
ter the 1990 legislation, and ends at $2.85 billion in 2010. On an inflation-adjusted basis, the average annual number of fines and disgorgements ordered during the last five years of the sequence increased
20.2 times over the average amount during the first five years.
Figure 5: Fines and Disgorgements Ordered in SEC Enforcement
325
Actions (Inflation Adjusted), 1981–2010
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2. Comparing the Public and Private Sectors
The figures tell us that the SEC’s enforcement reach has been extended materially since 1964. But they tell us nothing about the “adequacy” of the resulting enforcement operation.

323

Penalties and disgorgements are regulated under sections 21B and 32 of the
1934 Act. Id. § 78u-2, 78ff.
324
Amounts ordered are often greater than amounts actually collected, as the SEC
has difficulty collecting awards from judgment-proof defendants. See, e.g., 2004 SEC
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 48 (2004), available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar04.pdf (reporting a balance sheet allowance for
doubtful accounts of 81.02%). The problem presumably stems from the fact that securities violations tend to occur at companies experiencing financial difficulty. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 55, at 724-26 (confirming empirically that securities fraud
tends to be an end-period problem).
325
See supra note 313.
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Figure 6 offers some information respecting magnitude and salience by comparing annual amounts of penalties and disgorgements
reported by the SEC with total annual class action settlement dollars.
The private sector certainly extracts larger sums, especially given big
ticket cases like those settled in the wake of Enron and WorldCom.
However, in recent years the SEC has pulled itself up to parity. Indeed, apart from the spike in private returns in 2006, the divergence
between the lines is surprisingly small. Figure 7 offers a contrasting
view, comparing annual numbers of initiated class actions to the annual number of initiated SEC enforcement actions. By this case-bycase measure, the SEC has the larger volume.
326

Figure 6: SEC v. Private Actions, Dollar Amounts, 1998–2010
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For SEC data, see, SEC ANN. REPS., supra note 313. For class action settlement
data see RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 1, fig. 1, and ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E.
SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2008
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 fig.1 (2009), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/
Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2008/Settlements_Through_12_2008.pdf.
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Figure 7: SEC v. Private Actions, Numbers Initiated, 1996–2010
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Not too much should be made of either comparison. The larger
private-sector dollar amounts reflect different incentives and objectives. Lawyers in the private sector are motivated by the possibility of
personal financial gain, while those working at the agency pursue reputational gain in addition to whatever motivation public service imparts. Plaintiffs’ attorneys evaluate potential class actions by settlement value. The SEC is more interested in the magnitude and
328
character of the violation and the proceeding’s deterrent pay off. It
also seeks to innovate by bringing new fact patterns within the ambit
329
of the antifraud regime. Finally, its enforcers cover a much broader
330
range of subject matter, dealing with the defalcations of brokerdealers, investment companies, and investment advisors in addition to
the narrow antifraud subject matter covered by private class actions.
327

For SEC data, see supra note 313. For class action filing data see CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 3 fig.2.
328
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-662T, MAJOR HUMAN CAPITAL
CHALLENGES AT SEC AND KEY TRADE AGENCIES 6 (2002) (statements of Richard J.
Hillman, Director, Fin. Markets and Cmty. Inv., & Loren Yager, Director, Int’l Affairs
and Trade); see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 777 (arguing that SEC enfocement actions focus on small companies, thus diminishing the overall deterrent effect
of SEC enforcement).
329
See Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 752 (describing communication to market participants as the foremost metric that SEC uses in prioritization); supra text accompanying note 308.
330
See 2009 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNATABILITY REP.: PUTTING INVESTORS
FIRST 9-11 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.pdf (describing the range of enforcement initiatives used by the SEC).
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The antifraud overlap segment makes up fifty percent of enforcement
331
volume at the SEC. The SEC still emerges as the higher volume en332
forcer, but less than Figure 7 indicates.
Finally, we compare the number of lawyers deployed in the public
and private sectors. From 2009 to 2010, five law firms were responsi333
ble for 61% of all payouts from class action settlements.
The law
334
firms in question employed a total of 453 lawyers in mid-2010.
Extrapolating, it took around 743 attorneys to produce the 2009–
2010 settlement yield. In 2009, the SEC enforcement division had a
total of 1223 personnel. Based on a rough estimation, 782 of those
335
were attorneys. The SEC thus matches the private sector in per capita human resources.
But there are significant differences in focus as well as subject
matter coverage. The SEC spends most of its enforcement resources
336
on primary investigation.
If there is a front line in fraud enforcement, it is here. In recent years, the number of investigations initiated
by the Enforcement Division has ranged from 3500 to 4500 annual337
ly. Eighty percent of the Division’s nonsupervisory lawyers work on

331

In 2008, twenty-three percent of SEC actions concerned issuer reporting problems. Adding actions concerning securities offerings (eighteen percent) and insider
trading (nine percent) brings the total to fifty percent. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 23. The SEC also initiated significant numbers of actions
against investment advisors, broker-dealers, and market manipulators. Id.; see also Cox
& Thomas, supra note 306, at 750 (calculating that half of SEC enforcement actions
could have a parallel private class action claim and noting that the subclass is split
fifty-fifty between actions respecting public offerings and those respecting other reporting violations).
332
Simi Kedia and co-authors compare SEC enforcement actions to private class
action litigation respecting GAAP violations, respectively, during the period 1996–
2006. Simi Kedia et al., The Deterrence Effects of SEC Enforcement and Class Action
Litigation ( June 2011) (manuscript at 3) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868578. The SEC initiated 474 proceedings; there were 1111
private class actions. Id. By this measure, private class actions show the higher volume.
333
See RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 14 (showing Robbins, Geller, Rudman, &
Dowd (30%); Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger, & Grossman (10%); Barroway, Topaz, Kessler, Meltzer, & Check (7%); Labaton Sucharow (7%); and Milberg (7%)).
334
The numbers were counted on the law firms’ web sites on July 24, 2010.
335
We arrived at this number using percentages for 2008 detailed in the 2009
GAO report. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 18. According to the report, 54% of non-supervisory positions in the Enforcement Division are
taken by investigative attorneys and 10.3% by trial attorneys. Our estimate assumes
that these percentages hold for supervisory personnel as well.
336
Extrapolating from the numbers reported in supra note 335, 80% of the Division’s lawyers do investigation and 20% do trial work.
337
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 22.
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338

the investigative side, while only twenty percent are trial lawyers.
This investigative investment spills over to the private sector where
plaintiffs’ law firms file complaints against companies already subjected to SEC investigations. Thirty percent of the class actions settled
339
in 2010 followed the settlement of an SEC action in the same case.
The average class action settlement in this SEC overlap subset was $13
million from 1996 to 2010; the average settlement in cases without the
340
overlap was $5.8 million.
Finally, we again note that the Enforcement Division is reputed to
341
be a troubled operation.
It suffers problems of morale and a high
personnel turnover rate, although improvements have been noted in
342
recent years. Agency staff also operate under cumbersome internal
343
Moreover, overall enforcement
review and approval procedures.
capacity is subject to political controls because the Division can grow
344
only to the extent that Congress allocates the necessary funds.
3. Sources of Funds
If Congress decided to make a stronger commitment to enforcement, the necessary monies would be available at no cost to the taxpayers. As noted above, the SEC is funded by fees it collects from exchange transactions and registrations. Figure 8 compares the agency’s
fee revenues to its operating costs from 1964 to 2010. Fee revenues
have exceeded costs since 1983.

338

See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 3 fig.2.
RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 11. Kedia and co-authors find in their sample comparing the SEC to class actions, that sixty percent of SEC investigations are accompanied by class action litigation. Kedia et al., supra note 332, at 2.
340
Id.; see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 763-77 (studying a dataset of cases of
private-SEC overlap and finding also that the SEC is more likely to target an issuer with a
lower market capitalization or an issuer in financial distress than are private plaintiffs).
341
See BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 302, at 211 (reporting a low level of staff
engagement “exacerbated” by a structure “which leaves middle managers feeling disempowered”); Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 757-59 (discussing staffing problems
at the SEC).
342
See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 19-20 (showing that
the turnover rate has decreased significantly in recent years); see also BOS. CONSULTING
GRP., supra note 302, at 42-43 (describing recent administrative initiatives at the Enforcement Division to improve morale and reduce turnover).
343
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 27-30 (stating that
“the process for supervisory review of enforcement cases is burdensome and unnecessarily redundant” and calling for a more efficient use of SEC resources).
344
See 2009 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 330, at 73-74
(describing the SEC budgeting process and its dependence on congressional approval).
339
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Figure 8: SEC Budget and Revenues, 1964–2010
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The sharp decrease in revenues that begins in 2007 results less
from decreased market volume than from Congress’s enactment of
346
the Fee Relief Act in 2002.
The Fee Relief Act achieved its objective
of aligning the agency’s revenues and costs in 2008. Previously, excess
revenues were remitted to the Treasury, but under the Fee Relief Act,
347
The
they are saved in a separate account for the SEC’s future use.
bottom line is that procuring funding for stepped-up enforcement
would be as simple as resetting the fees.
There is yet another potential source of funds. The SEC historically endeavored to return profits disgorged by defendants to victimized investors; penalties were remitted to the Treasury. Sarbanes348
Oxley’s Fair Funds provision changed that, charging the SEC to endeavor to return penalty monies to injured investors. The decision to
349
remit is left to the agency’s discretion in any given case. The agency
has followed the course indicated by the statute and remits the funds
to investors. Indeed, the agency has created a new Office of Collec350
The SEC distritions and Distributions to administer these funds.
345

SEC ANN. REPS., supra note 313.
See supra text accompanying notes 258-75.
347
2009 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 330, at 73.
348
15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)–(b) (2006).
349
See id. § 7246(a) (“[T]he amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at
the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement
fund for the benefit of the victims of such violation.”).
350
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 4. The action came at
the instance of a GAO recommendation. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-07-830, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED
346
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buted $6.6 billion from 2002 to 2009, of which $2.1 billion flowed out
351
in 2009 alone.
Congress, having elevated the shareholders’ interest in these
funds in 2002, redirected a portion to cover the costs of stepped-up
352
enforcement under the Dodd-Frank Act. This provides that 10-30%
of penalties and disgorgements ordered in SEC proceedings be made
available to pay any whistleblowers who provided the agency with essential information in the case. The SEC is directed to set aside a
353
fund for this purpose, drawing on disgorgement and penalty fees.
354
The SEC duly set aside $452 million in 2010.
The whistleblower fund is a step in the right direction. From a
policy point of view, it correctly elevates the deterrence objective over
shareholders’ interest in compensation. From a practical point of
view, it confirms this Article’s fiscal point: should a future Congress
again decide to invest in stepped-up antifraud deterrence, funding
concerns do not present a barrier.
Recall that some criticize FOTM because shareholders ultimately
pay the settlements. We now add a countervailing point: it makes no
difference who does the enforcing, as the shareholders always end up
picking up the tab. The costs, however, fall differentially within the
shareholder class under each regime. Private costs fall hardest on undiversified long-term holders; public costs fall hardest on those who
do the most trading.
4. Bang for the Buck
Given that the shareholders pay under either scheme, the question remains as to comparative costs and results between the private
and public sector enforcement.

TO ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
OPERATIONS 25-31 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07930.pdf

(discussing the SEC’s plans to establish a centralized Fair Fund office).
351
2004 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 330, at 11.
352
Dodd-Frank § 922, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78-d (West Supp. 2 2011).
353
Id.
354
2010 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 21, available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf.
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Figure 9: Judgment or Settlement Amounts
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Figure 9 sets out the results of an eleven-year (1999–2009) comparison between class action attorneys’ fees calculated assuming a
356
payout of 23% of the settlement and the cost of the SEC Enforcement Division calculated on the assumption that the Division receives
357
34% of the agency’s annual budget. A 23% average class action attorneys’ fees award implies a damage payout of $4.35 per enforcement
dollar invested. The SEC enforcement payout, taken as the average
annual quotient of announced disgorgements and penalties divided
by the cost of running the Enforcement Division, is $6.20 per dollar
invested. On this comparison, then, private enforcement emerges as
358
relatively more expensive than public enforcement.
Next comes the question of which sector, public or private, provides the shareholders with more bang for their buck? Standard policy analysis in corporate law strongly favors the private side. Private en355

RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 11 fig.11.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text (studying the period 1993–2008).
357
The 34% figure is derived by comparing the Enforcement Division budget for
the years 2004 to 2008, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 19, to
the SEC’s overall budget for each year, SEC ANN. REPS., supra note 313. It is an average of the five years’ figures.
358
The result reverses conventional wisdom regarding the respective costs of public and private enforcement. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1429 (2003) (citing studies on airlines, waste collection, electric utilities, and postal services that found a public sector
approach to cost between 30% and 90% more than a private sector approach).
356
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forcement benefits from the sharp prod of financial incentives, while
public enforcers are civil servants working within burdensome administrative constraints. The numbers here suggest a stronger case for the
359
High-powered private incenpublic side than generally assumed.
tives come at a cash price, and maintaining the cash machine builds a
dependence on enterprise liability, a suboptimal result from an enforcement point of view. An administrative framework could work
better here, given the chance. An adequately funded agency could
redirect its efforts to individual perpetrators as a matter of policy
choice, while the private bar is locked in by its own private economics.
Now consider a follow-up question. Suppose that shareholders
were offered a choice: maintain the status quo or double the SEC enforcement budget and abolish FOTM, leaving the door open for private
actions against nontrading issuers where actual reliance can be shown.
The case for doubling resources on the public side is quite plausible,
but so is indifference between the two choices. The only result that
these numbers preclude is a hands-down preference for FOTM.
B. The SEC as Agent for Reform
1. A Quid Pro Quo
The plaintiffs’ bar looks for settlement value, but the SEC has other incentives and can thus pursue law enforcement objectives. Where
the plaintiffs’ bar is driven by the economics of settlement and locked
into enterprise liability, the SEC is limited by its budget. The SEC also
settles and, in so doing, often pursues the path of least resistance by
accepting a payment from the corporation rather than pursuing indi360
Given additional funds and personnel, the SEC
vidual miscreants.
could push harder to target individual defendants and force them to
pay, adding deterrent effect. Indeed, the SEC has already taken a step
in this direction in its settlements with individual defendants, using
361
the settlement agreement to block resort to D&O insurance policies.
359

The Kedia study reports a roughly equal deterrent effect for SEC enforcement
actions and private class actions directed against GAAP violations that use reversal of
income-increasing accruals in the industry in question as a measure of deterrent impact. Kedia et al., supra note 332, at 3. It follows that the SEC is not as ineffective as it
is usually portrayed.
360
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
361
See DAN BAILEY & TOM GEYER, SEC’S DIM VIEW OF INDEMNIFICATION DARKENS 1
(2005), available at http://www.baileycavalieri.com/68-SECs_View_Indemnification.
pdf (describing the SEC’s actions as motivated by public policy).
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A stronger push need not implicate overdeterrence. Administrative
intelligence can seek out the sweet spot where a private incentive to
maximize returns holds out risks.
We have no answer as to how much additional funding and how
much time would be required to build the needed organizational infrastructure. We only point out that the money is available, whether
from increased fees or further diversion of penalty and disgorgement
proceeds to deterrent use. If Congress doubled the SEC’s budget,
and the SEC devoted the entire increase to enforcement, funding for
enforcement would increase 300% over its present level.
But why would the SEC make such a request? Although calls for
large SEC budget increases have been commonplace in the wake of
362
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, a one-time, precedent-breaking
request for enforcement funding could hold out negative political
implications. Professor Langevoort describes the politics of the SEC’s
363
On the one hand, the agency needs to
budget as a balancing act.
depict the markets as investor friendly, for otherwise it has failed in its
mission. On the other hand, it also needs to depict a continuing
threat from miscreant executives. Historically, both sides of the balance have signaled moderate increases in enforcement resources,
even as the balance has inhibited the agency from seeking a large enforcement increase.
Further, even assuming the SEC made the request, why would
Congress agree? While it has often increased the SEC’s budget, it has
done so incrementally and never by leaps and bounds. Unusual increases tend to come in the wake of scandals and legislative overhauls. In addition, strong opposition from the business lobby can be
364
safely predicted.
Within the present political economy of securities law enforcement, then, there is neither a reason for the SEC to request an extraordinary budget increase directed to enforcement nor for Congress
to grant one. But political equilibriums can be disrupted.

362

For example, in 2011, the SEC sought a fifteen percent increase at a time of
budget austerity. It found itself forced to drum up support to stave off a freeze. See
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Aids S.E.C. Case For Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at B1
(reporting that former SEC lawyers now on Wall Street have lobbied for increased
funding for the SEC).
363
See Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1143-44.
364
See id. at 1144-45 (discussing opposition to SEC budget increases from institutional investors, broker-dealers, accountants, and the securities bar).
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We think Congress would view increases in the SEC enforcement
budget more favorably if a political giveback came in tandem. More
particularly, we propose a quid pro quo: stepped-up public enforcement in exchange for reduced reliance on private enforcement; increased enforcement funding in exchange for the elimination of the
FOTM presumption. The objective is to achieve a more effective enforcement regime geared against individual defendants while avoiding
an overall increase in costs borne by shareholders.
2. Rulemaking Power, Job Opportunities,
and the Management Interest
Our proposition is simple, and its objectives have solid grounding
in two decades of policy analysis. The party best situated to effectuate
the proposal is the SEC, which recently has been reorganizing, re365
forming, and expanding its enforcement operation.
In our view, the SEC has the power to remove the FOTM presumption via rulemaking. The authority follows from the words of
section 10(b), which delegates authority to make such antifraud “rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap366
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” It
has been argued, plausibly in our view, that the resulting envelope of
authority is capacious enough to allow the SEC to disimply the 10b-5
367
Even if that were not the case and judicial
private right of action.
implication of a private action were somehow deemed to limit the
368
SEC’s rulemaking authority, many of the terms of the private right of
action remain open to clarification, modification, or reversal by rule.
The matter is not entirely clear, however. It can be argued that ex
post statutory modifications of a private right of action imply congressional ratification of the action’s basic terms, including the FOTM

365

See supra note 275.
1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
367
See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 976-79 (1994) (failing
to see any legal obstacle to the Commission’s ability to disimply private rights of action).
368
We think that result is unlikely. Our view would be different if the statute itself
created the private right of action. See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (reading express private right of action to block administrative rulemaking over
the scope of substantive rights).
366
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369

presumption.
Were this interpretation to prevail, our proposal
would have to be remitted to Congress in its entirety.
Either way, we look to the SEC to take the initiative. The SEC
should assume primary responsibility for antifraud enforcement,
along with all accompanying management and planning problems,
and step away from a longstanding, ad hoc public-private arrangement. The public-private back and forth presents career opportunities. Many members of the SEC’s senior staff come from elite law
firms, and they use their agency experience to return to the private
370
sector with enhanced prestige. Upon return, they tend to do corporate defense work, which does not necessarily exist absent plaintiffs
with plausible causes of action. Even assuming more SEC enforcement
actions, and hence more SEC defense work, eliminating FOTM could
shrink billable hours across the sector. Thus might our proposal excite
opposition on both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ sides of the bar.
To the extent that the plaintiffs’ bar and its allies may exert their
influence against our proposal, we could offer a modification. Instead
of striking FOTM from the books directly, the SEC (or Congress)
could turn the matter over to the shareholder community and orchestrate the across-the-board opt-in/opt-out referendum we hypothesized
371
in Part III. To the extent the FOTM interest thereupon persuaded
its putative beneficiaries (and financial underwriters) of the value of
its services, the shareholders would opt to stay in, and FOTM would
emerge with its legitimacy much enhanced.

369

This occurred with the enactment of the PSLRA. PSLRA § 21D, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4. The theory would be that recognition implies the reception of the basic judicial outlines of the action into the statutory scheme, so as to shield the action from alteration by agency rulemaking. The Supreme Court brought congressional ratification
to the fore in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
165 (2008), concluding that congressional recognition tied the Court’s hands and
blocked an expansion of the action’s scope.
370
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in
the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1604- 05 (2006) (scrutinizing the revolving door of SEC lawyers and private practice and its connection to new regulations).
371
There are incidental questions concerning the SEC’s institutional disposition.
Respecting antifraud, the agency has always followed a regulation-by-litigation strategy
and expressed a preference for standards over rules. See id. at 1619-20 (noting the
formation of policy more often through enforcement than through rulemaking); Langevoort, supra note 206, at 1337 (referring to William L. Cary’s comment that rules are
a “blueprint for fraud” because of unintended loopholes and barely legal schemes).
Our proposal does not traverse these preferences, but it simply relegates private plaintiffs’ lawyers to a diminished role in the creation of law.
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We also acknowledge a risk of unintended effects. The management interest could seize the occasion to effect a net reduction in enforcement resources. This result would follow if, say, the SEC were to
present a plan to Congress, and Congress then decided to eliminate
the FOTM presumption legislatively without approving a compensating increase to the SEC’s enforcement budget.
This is possible, but in our view unlikely. We have seen that the
politics tilt in favor of enforcement with the less attractive aspects of
the private action providing the political point of engagement for
management opposition. Any residual chance of political disruption
can be minimized if the SEC took the lead and eliminated FOTM by
rule. Congress would be called on only to assent to budgetary expan372
sion, which could precede a FOTM rulemaking, which could be
conditioned on the budget initiative’s success. Alternatively, an optin/opt-out approach holding open a door for company-by-company
reentry would minimize the risk of an unintended decrease in overall
enforcement resources.
C. Summary
We hold out no hopes for early adoption of either of our reform
proposals—this Part’s quid pro quo, or the national shareholder
FOTM referendum proposed in Part III. We propose them as possibilities to make a point about federal securities laws’ reliance on a mix
of private and public enforcement. Private class actions continue to
be endorsed solely on the assumption that public enforcement is
crippled by budgetary and incentive constraints, but that assumption
went out of date in the post-Enron era. Meanwhile, substantive criticisms of FOTM formerly made by a minority of observers have risen to
the status of a consensus view. It is time to conjoin these two developments and rethink the whole.
CONCLUSION
The question is not whether FOTM as we know it should go. The
closer one looks at FOTM’s doctrinal and economic supports, the

372

Statutory limits on penalties might also need to be considered. Under sections
21(d)(3) and 21B(b) of the 1934 Act, penalties max out at $100,000 “for each act or
omission.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B), 78u-2(b). These penalties are subject to periodic upward inflation adjustment under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note.
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harder it is to defend. Rather, the questions are how and when FOTM
will go. These are tougher, for FOTM’s institutional and political supports stand up to inspection much better than its substantive supports.
We expect the questioning to intensify in coming years. Management is ready to hand the Congress another PSLRA whenever a favorable political window opens. At the same time, the SEC is slowly
pointing its growing enforcement operation toward individual miscreants. These oppositional forces could over time precipitate a rootand-branch reconsideration of securities law enforcement policy, with
FOTM being eclipsed as the SEC accepts more responsibility.

